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Under the formal rules of criminal procedure, fact finders are required to
apply a uniform standard of proof in all criminal cases. Experimental stud-
ies as well as real world examples indicate, however, that fact finders often
adjust the evidentiary threshold for conviction in accordance with the se-
verity of the applicable sanction. All things being equal, the higher the
sanction, the higher the standard of proof that fact finders will apply in or-
der to convict. Building on this insight, this Article introduces a new
paradigm for criminal punishments-a paradigm that focuses on designing
penalties that will reduce the risk of unsubstantiated convictions. By setting
mandatory penalties of sufficient size, the legal system can induce fact find-
ers to convict only if sufficient admissible evidence proves a defendant's
guilt. This Article applies this theoretical framework to three concrete con-
texts that involve a high risk of erroneous convictions: inchoate crimes, the
right to silence, and the punishment of recidivists. It shows that a sanction-
ing regime that is attuned to the probative function of punishment can
protect innocent defendants from unsubstantiated convictions while obeying
the dictates of both deterrence and retribution.
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INTRODUCTION
The rules of criminal procedure presume a fixed standard of proof. A
person accused of any criminal offense can be convicted only if sufficient
evidence proves her guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt."' While legal schol-
arship has debated the standard's precise probabilistic requirement,2 it has
uniformly assumed that its meaning is the same across different criminal
contexts. 3 Whether the applicable penalty is a fine, probation, or imprison-
ment, fact finders are expected to apply an identical evidentiary standard in
all criminal cases.
A rich body of empirical and experimental studies indicates, however,
that fact finders adjust the burden of proof in accordance with size of the
applicable sanction.4 These studies, as well as real-world examples, show
that, rather than applying a fixed standard, judges and jurors often elevate
the probative threshold for conviction as the severity of the punishment in-
creases. Keeping all other variables constant, courts demand that the
prosecution present more convincing proof of the defendant's guilt in the
face of greater potential punishment. Thus, evidence that meets the thresh-
old for obtaining a guilty verdict where a lenient penalty is involved does
not necessarily meet the threshold for the same verdict where a harsher
sanction is involved. Such behavior on the part of judges and jurors has
been identified across a range of offenses and sanctions of varying severity.
As this Article demonstrates, legal scholars' misperception of the way in
which fact finders determine guilt overlooks the probative function of crim-
inal sanctions.5 Because the size of the applicable punishment often
1. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that the Constitution protects
every criminal defendant "against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt
of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged").
2. For a recent review of the literature and cases dealing with the question, see Peter
Tillers & Jonathan Gottfried, Case Comment-United States v. Copeland, 396 E Supp. 2d
275 (E.D.N. Y 2005): A Collateral Attack on the Legal Maxim That Proof Beyond a Reasona-
ble Doubt Is Unquantifiable?, 5 L., PROBABILITY & RISK 135 (2006).
3. See, e.g., Richard Lempert, The Economic Analysis of Evidence Law: Common
Sense on Stilts, 87 VA. L. REv. 1619, 1664 (2001) ("[W]e do not adjust the criminal burden
of proof based on likely sanctions.").
4. For a review of this literature, see infra Part I.
5. An exception to the academic disregard of the possible interdependence of crimi-
nal sanctions and evidentiary thresholds is James Andreoni, Reasonable Doubt and the
Optimal Magnitude of Fines: Should the Penalty Fit the Crime?, 22 RAND J. ECON. 385
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determines the evidentiary threshold for conviction, criminal sanctions can
adjust the standard of proof that fact finders apply. More specifically, this
Article shows that the legal system may exploit this observed phenomenon
to protect defendants against convictions founded on inadmissible or insuf-
ficient evidence. In cases in which fact finders decline to follow instructions
regarding the information they may consider, designing a penalty that effec-
tively raises the burden of proof can calibrate the scale for determining guilt.
Similarly, where fact finders are likely to rely on unreliable incriminating
evidence, raising the evidentiary bar by elevating the sanction can prevent
the risk of unsubstantiated convictions.
Using criminal sanctions to incentivize fact finders enables the legal sys-
tem to protect defendants in cases in which more direct approaches are
unlikely to succeed. Arguably, convictions that are based on inadmissible or
insufficient evidence can be prevented through regulation of the fact-finding
process. Stringent jury instructions, for example, are expected to exclude
inadmissible information from deliberations and to guide the jury as to the
amount of evidence required to reach a conviction. Such direct regulation,
however, has been proved ineffective in various contexts.6 As observed both
by scholars and practitioners, juries often disregard admonishing instruc-
tions and may convict defendants even when the prosecution fails to present
an amount of admissible evidence that merits a conviction. By inducing fact
finders to adjust their evidentiary standards, criminal sanctions can prevent
unsubstantiated convictions in contexts in which the rules of evidence and
criminal procedure fail to do so.
Legal analysis regarding the desirable levels of punishment has tradi-
tionally focused on retribution and deterrence.7 Although these theories
differ in many respects, they share the important premise that criminal sanc-
tions should be designed in response to offenders' and victims' behavior.8
Opposed to this offender- and victim-centered approach, the following dis-
cussion suggests the potential to construct penalties that will prevent
unsubstantiated convictions. This insight-that sanctions can serve to
protect defendants-introduces an overlooked paradigm in the context of
criminal punishment. Furthermore, our analysis demonstrates that criminal
sanctions can often be designed to protect defendants from erroneous con-
victions without sacrificing the dictates of either retribution or deterrence. A
carefully crafted penal regime can reduce the number of defendants who are
(1991). Using a stylized economic model, Andreoni highlights the need to consider this pos-
sible interdependence when devising sanctions that will produce optimal deterrence.
Andreoni's analysis does not address, however, the value of using criminal sanctions to in-
centivize fact finders.
6. See, e.g., infra Section III.B.1 (presenting evidence regarding the ineffectiveness
of rules that prohibit negative inferences from silence).
7. For recent reviews of the literature, see, for example, STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDA-
TIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 473-530 (2004) (reviewing different deterrence
models), and Gerard V. Bradley, Retribution: The Central Aim of Punishment, 27 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 19 (2003) (reviewing theories of retribution).
8. For a review of these theories, see infra Part II.
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wrongfully convicted, while at the same time subjecting guilty defendants to
an appropriate sanction.
This Article shows how the legal system may harness fact finders'
tendency to adjust the burden of proof in accordance with the size of the
sanction in three concrete contexts: inchoate offenses (criminal attempts),
the right to silence, and the punishment of recidivists. Legal scholarship has
suggested that defendants in these circumstances often face a heightened
risk of being convicted on the basis of inadmissible or insufficient evidence.
The conventional tools that the legal system employs to ensure the integrity
of the criminal process seem ineffective in such circumstances. This Article
highlights the virtue of setting mandatory sanctions of sufficient size in
these contexts. By applying such a regime, the legal system can prevent
wrongful convictions in criminal attempt cases while sustaining the crime-
control benefits associated with punishing incomplete offenses, strengthen
the right to silence without harming those who exercise it, and reduce the
risk of wrongful convictions for defendants who have a criminal record.
The paradigm that our analysis presents is tied to the current debate sur-
rounding the increasingly mandatory nature of the American sentencing
system. Since the 1980s judicial discretion with respect to sentencing has
been systematically reduced. 9 This trend has recently been addressed in the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker,'0 holding that the
mandatory nature of the federal sentencing guidelines is unconstitutional
because it violates defendants' right to a jury trial. While critics of this trend
raise valid and important concerns," they have neglected to acknowledge
the potentially beneficial effect that a system incorporating this feature has
on fact finders' decisions. As this Article's analysis shows, the imposition of
mandatory sanctions of sufficient size can discourage fact finders from con-
victing absent sufficient admissible evidence.
This Article unfolds as follows. Part I presents the findings on the inter-
play between the severity of sanctions and the evidentiary threshold for
conviction. These findings show that, contrary to conventional wisdom,
fact finders do not apply a fixed standard of proof, but instead adjust it in
proportion to the size of potential punishment. Part II claims that criminal
sanctions should be used to correct for the risk of erroneous convictions.
While criminal law scholarship has traditionally focused on offenders and
victims, this Part shows the virtue of designing criminal sanctions as a
means to protect defendants from wrongful convictions. Part III explores
this claim in three concrete contexts: the punishment of criminal attempts,
the right to remain silent, and the punishment of repeat offenders. It demon-
9. For a descriptive account of this phenomenon, see Ryan Scott Reynolds, Equal
Justice Under Law: Post-Booker, Should Federal Judges Be Able To Depart from the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines to Remedy Disparity Between Codefendants'Sentences?, 109 COLUM.
L. REv. 538, 540-46 (2009).
10. 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
11. See generally, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A
Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 901 (1991) (criticizing the mandatory nature
of the federal sentencing guidelines).
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strates that by focusing on fact finders' incentives, the legal system can of-
ten protect defendants from erroneous convictions without sacrificing the
other goals of punishment. Part IV addresses possible objections to this pro-
posal from both doctrinal and practical perspectives. It shows that the
proposed penal regime can be applied while maintaining the rules that
shield fact finders from information regarding penalties, and that it can also
give rise to concrete policies. Finally, the Conclusion highlights the poten-
tial implications of this Article's analysis beyond the realm of criminal
sanctions.
I. ENDOGENOUS EVIDENTIARY THRESHOLDS
This Part reviews the evidence regarding the connection between the
size of sanctions imposed by the legal system and the amount of evidence
that triers of fact require in order to convict defendants. Empirical studies,
policymakers' and judges' experiences, and legal doctrine itself all show
that the evidentiary threshold for conviction is correlated with the size of
criminal punishments. This interdependence of sanctions' severity and the
willingness of fact finders to convict exists along a continuum. At one end,
when the size of punishment is disproportionately high, fact finders often
refuse to convict even in the face of overwhelming incriminating evidence.
Below the disproportional-penalty boundary, however, fact finders' willing-
ness to convict is connected to the severity of the applicable sanction. As the
sanction increases in size, fact finders require additional evidence in order to
reach a guilty verdict.
Empirical studies examining courts' decisions identify a clear correla-
tion between fact finders' willingness to convict and the severity of the
charges that the defendant faces. 2 For example, Professor Myers explores
this question using data from a random sample of 201 cases that were tried
in front of juries.13 Myers's analysis shows that an inverse relation exists
between the severity of the charge and the frequency of conviction. As the
severity of the charge increases, the willingness of the jury to convict de-
creases.14 Myers interprets this result as support for the claim that jurors
raise the evidentiary standard as the stakes of the case become higher. As
she notes, "[w]here the crime is not as serious, juries may accept a lower
standard of proof." 5 Three later studies provide similar results, further
12. See, e.g., James Andreoni, Criminal Deterrence in the Reduced Form: A New Per-
spective on Ehrlich's Seminal Study, 33 ECON. INQUIRY 476, 479-82 (1995) (using
regression analysis to demonstrate a negative connection between the level of punishment
and conviction rates); Martha A. Myers, Rule Departures and Making Law: Juries and Their
Verdicts, 13 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 781, 793-94 (1979); Carol M. Werner et al., The Impact of
Case Characteristics and Prior Jury Experience on Jury Verdicts, 15 J. APPLIED Soc. PSY-
CHOL. 409, 471 (1985).
13. Myers, supra note 12, at 785.




demonstrating the inverse relationship between the size of sanctions and
conviction rates. 16
While these empirical studies suggest that fact finders are sensitive to
the level of punishment when determining guilt, the studies alone do not
provide a clear-cut conclusion. Several factors may explain their findings.
As the literature has suggested, the drop in conviction rates for more severe
charges may be caused, for example, by defendants' increased expenditures
on legal defense, and not by a higher evidentiary standard employed by the
trier of fact.17 Experimental studies specifically designed to control for vari-
ous variables can thus offer a more complete and accurate picture of the
actual effect of sanctions' severity on the burden of proof.
Psychologists and legal scholars investigating fact finders' behavior
have employed two methodologies. Under one approach, both judges and
potential jurors are asked to indicate the evidentiary threshold they would
apply in determining whether the defendant had committed the offense for
which she was charged. 18 Under a different approach, using hypothetical
cases and random grouping of participants, researchers examine the effect
of sanctions' severity on the final verdict. 19 Both methodologies demonstrate
that as the severity of the sanction rises, fact finders demand evidence with
greater probative strength to support a conviction.
In a wide-ranging study focusing on public opinion regarding the death
penalty, Professors Ellsworth and Ross found that the existence of a manda-
tory death penalty raises the amount of evidence required by jurors in order
to convict.20 More specifically, among supporters of the death penalty-
participants who expressed a willingness to convict in capital cases if
defendant's guilt is proved beyond a reasonable doubt--over 60% indicated
that as jurors they would have required "much more" or "somewhat more"
evidence to render a guilty verdict.21 Ellsworth and Ross's findings demon-
strate the interdependence of the size of the sanction and the evidentiary
threshold. The introduction of the death penalty raises the stakes in the case,
and as a consequence, jurors raise the amount of evidence they demand.
Ellsworth and Ross's study focuses on a single criminal context (the
death penalty). By contrast, an experiment conducted by Professors Simon
16. See Werner et al., supra note 12, at 414, 417, 419-20; Andreoni, supra note 12, at
481-82; Fusako Tsuchimoto & Libor Dugek, Responses to More Severe Punishment in the
Courtroom: Evidence from Truth-in-Sentencing Laws 11, 17 (Dec. 14, 2009) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1441703.
17. See Andreoni, supra note 12, at 476, 481 (acknowledging the difficulty in disen-
tangling these effects in empirical studies).
18. See infra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
20. Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Lee Ross, Public Opinion and Judicial Decision Making:
An Example from Research on Capital Punishment, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES 152, 169 (Hugo Adam Bedau & Chester M. Pierce eds., 1976).
21. See id. Among opponents of the death penalty, 40 percent indicated that they
would never vote in favor of a guilty verdict, while another 40 percent indicated that they
would require "much more" or "somewhat more" evidence in order to convict. Id.
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and Mahan explores fact finders' behavior across a spectrum of criminal
offenses. 22 In their study, Simon and Mahan presented a list of criminal of-
fenses-ranging from petty larceny to murder-to groups of judges and
mock jurors. Participants were then asked to indicate, in probabilistic terms,
the level of proof they would require to convict in these cases. In each
group, participants adjusted the burden of proof in accordance with the se-
verity of the offense. In the group of mock jurors, participants interpreted
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard to require the probability that the
defendant committed the crime to be 75% to support a petty larceny convic-
tion, 82% to support a burglary conviction, and 95% to support a murder
conviction. 23 Among judges the discrepancy was smaller, but there was nev-
ertheless a noticeable difference between the various offenses. For example,
whereas judges interpreted the standard as requiring a certainty of 87% to
support a conviction in petty theft cases, they required 92% certainty in
murder cases.
24
Professor Kerr used a more complex design to directly test the effect of
sanctions' severity on evidentiary thresholds.25 Kerr presented participants
with a hypothetical case of a defendant who caused the death of another
person in the course of a robbery. 26 To examine the connection between
the level of sanctions and conviction rates, participants were randomly
assigned to groups that were each informed of a different sanction in the
case of conviction, and then read written testimony that referred to the
question whether the shooting was intentional or accidental.27 Participants
were asked several questions regarding the evidentiary criteria they used
to determine whether to convict. 28 Kerr's findings demonstrate that the
penalty attached to the crime has a direct bearing on the conviction rate. All
else being equal, as the severity of the punishment rises, conviction rates
drop. In the severe-penalty condition the conviction rate was 62%, com-
pared with 69.4% in the mild-penalty condition.29 Furthermore, calculating
the relative effect of the various variables, Kerr shows that this result is
caused by an upward adjustment of the evidentiary threshold for convic-
tion employed by the participants. As he explains, "[i]ncreasing the
severity of the prescribed penalty for an offense resulted in an adjustment
22. Rita James Simon & Linda Mahan, Quantifying Burdens of Proof: A View from the
Bench, the Jury, and the Classroom, 5 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 319 (1971).
23. Id. at 328.
24. Id.
25. Norbert L. Kerr, Severity of Prescribed Penalty and Mock Jurors' Verdicts, 36 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1431 (1978) [hereinafter Kerr, Severity of Prescribed Penal-
ty]; see also Norbert Kerr, Stochastic Models of Juror Decision Making, in INSIDE THE
JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING 126-29 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993) (dis-
cussing the experiment's results and implications).
26. Kerr, Severity of Prescribed Penalty, supra note 25, at 1435.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1437.
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of subjects' conviction criteria such that more proof of guilt was required
for conviction and thus resulted in a reduced probability of conviction.
30
The insight that fact finders adjust the burden of proof in proportion to
the severity of punishment has been recognized not only in academic stud-
ies, but also by policymakers and judges. Politicians involved in the design
of criminal prohibitions have long since alluded to this phenomenon as a
consideration that should be taken into account when setting the size of
criminal penalties. Judges, based on their actual courtroom experience, have
also acknowledged the interplay between sanction severity and evidentiary
thresholds for conviction. Both politicians' and judges' accounts corrobo-
rate the experimental findings and suggest their external validity.
An illustrative example of policymakers' concerns surrounding the evi-
dentiary implications of criminal sanctions can be found in drug offense
legislation. Although deterrence-oriented legislatures often advocate enhanc-
ing the sanctions for crimes, in the context of drug-related offenses,
legislatures have sometimes reduced the level of punishment. Given fact find-
ers' flexible evidentiary standards, diminishing the size of the punishment can
serve to increase the likelihood of obtaining guilty verdicts. More lenient pun-
ishments that induce high conviction rates can in turn provide greater
deterrence than harsher punishments that trigger low conviction rates. For ex-
ample, in the late 1960s, Nebraska lowered the penalty for marijuana
possession from a prison sentence of two to five years to a maximum penalty
of a seven-day incarceration.3' The goal of this policy change was not to
weaken the punitive attitude toward marijuana but rather to strengthen it by
overcoming the hurdle of securing convictions in the face of harsher punish-
ment.32 As the senator who promoted the bill noted: "With the 7 day penalty
for the possession of a nominal amount, the courts will rather promiscuously
[sic] based on the evidence, apply these penalties."
3
More recently, the focal point for tough-on-crime legislation has shifted
to the area of sex offenses. Although the general trend has moved toward
increasing the penalty for such offences, policymakers have emphasized the
need to curb the level of sanctions in order to avoid an increase in the bur-
den of proof. For example, during a recent legislative debate surrounding
the enactment of a new law punishing sex offenders, Maine legislators de-
cided to opt for a milder version of the law. Their concern was that the
tougher bill would make it harder to secure convictions, and would force
prosecutors to make victims take the stand in order to present more evidence
30. Id. at 1439.
31. John F Galliher et al., Nebraska's Marijuana Law: A Case of Unexpected Legisla-
tive Innovation, 8 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 441,442 (1974).
32. Id. at 444-46.
33. Id. at 446 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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to the court. 34 Representative Stan Gerzofsky, a member of the Criminal
Justice Committee, noted as follows:
The bottom line is, the original version of Jessica's law would have put
more dangerous sex offenders on the streets, without any incarceration or
supervision.... The bill would have dramatically increased the burden
of proof needed to get a conviction, and that would put young victims in
jeopardy and more predators on the street.
35
In light of this concern, and notwithstanding public pressure, the Maine
legislature decided to avoid adopting a harsh twenty-five-year mandatory
minimum sentence to enforce the new legislation.36
Several other examples reflect prosecutors' concerns that tough sanc-
tions for sex offenders will raise the burden of proof for sex crimes. In
California, for instance, prosecutors worried that raising the penalty for rape
would elevate the amount of evidence needed to secure a conviction, such
that evidence that was sufficient for a conviction under the lighter sanction
would not suffice under the harsher penalty. As one local newspaper report-
ed: "Acquaintance rape cases often boil down to the victim's word against
her alleged attacker's, and some prosecutors worry that juries may be reluc-
tant to convict acquaintance rape suspects if the punishment has to be life
behind bars.
37
Anecdotal evidence regarding judges' sentencing practices provides
additional support for the correlation between evidentiary standards and
the level of punishment. Prior to the Supreme Court's holding in Apprendi
v. New Jersey,38 it was formally permissible to prove disputed facts at sen-
tencing hearings by a preponderance of the evidence. Nevertheless, in a
pre-Apprendi survey of judges for the Eastern and Southern Districts of
New York, judges acknowledged that they applied a more flexible ap-
proach.39 More specifically, nearly half of the judges stated that they
relied "on a sliding-scale approach, in which the burden of proof changes
34. Press Release, Maine House Democrats, House Vote Overwhelmingly to Pass
Jessica's Law (Apr. 27, 2006), available at http://www.maine.gov/tools/whatsnew/
index.php?topic=HouseDems+News&id= 16002&v=Article.
35. Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
36. Id.
37. Ken Chavez Bee, Wilson Seeks I Strike for Rape: Uses Carter Case To Push for
Life Terms for First ime Sex Offenders, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 28, 1994, at Al. Similarly,
the chairman of the legislative committee of Iowa's County Attorneys Association lobbied
against an Iowa bill that would have raised sanctions for sex offenders. Underlying the objec-
tion to this proposed bill was the concern that "[w]hen the penalties are set so high, it makes
it difficult to get a conviction without rock-solid evidence." Editorial, Legislature Deaf to
Law Enforcement's Wishes; Prosecutors Should Have Been Involved in Drafting the Sexual
Predator Law, TEL. HERALD (Dubuque, Iowa), Aug. 3, 2005, at A4.
38. 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (ruling that "any fact that increases the penalty for a
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt").
39. See Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge's Second Impression of the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 357, 360-464 (1992).
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relative to the effect on the defendant of the issue being proved."'4 Thus,
for facts that would significantly enlarge a defendant's sentence, these
judges often required clear and convincing evidence or even proof beyond
a reasonable doubt.41 The remaining judges, while they did not explicitly
acknowledge this practice, still admitted that the degree of certainty they
required might change depending on the impact of their finding on the
defendant.
42
At times, judges have even openly acknowledged that they hold the
prosecution to a higher evidentiary standard in cases where the defendants
might be subjected to stiff penalties. In one publicized child molestation
case in Louisiana involving a defendant with prior convictions, the court
ruled that the evidentiary threshold the prosecution must satisfy "is a
heightened burden of proof because this defendant faces a life sentence.
43
Finally, despite its assumption of a fixed evidentiary threshold, legal
doctrine itself offers evidence regarding the interplay between the severity
of sanctions and the standard of proof. Under the current legal regime,
jurors generally do not receive information regarding the penalty the de-
fendant faces if convicted. 44 This rule has often been justified as a means
to prevent attempts by the defense to induce jury nullification when the
sanction is perceived to be beyond the disproportional-penalty boundary.
45
However, some cases also suggest that this rule may actually serve to pre-
vent attempts by the prosecution or by trial judges to induce conviction by
referring to the leniency of the applicable sanction. Indeed, numerous
court decisions have underscored the point that providing information
regarding mitigating factors may cause fact finders to lower the eviden-
tiary threshold for a conviction, which may ultimately lead to
unsubstantiated convictions.
40. Id. at 361.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 362 (quoting one of these judges as stating that "[tihe more serious the im-
pact of the decision on the defendant's punishment, the more reliable the type of proof I
require to make up my mind").
43. Joe Darby, Alleged Molester Faces New Charges; Judge Defends Acquittal Deci-
sion, "IMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Dec. 4, 1999, at Al. Interestingly, critics of the
court's decision, referring to the accepted legal wisdom, emphasized that the burden of proof
is expected to be equal for all cases. As the chief of felony trials for the local district attor-
ney's office noted, "[t]he state shouldn't be held to a higher burden of proof just because a
defendant faces a life sentence." Id. Nevertheless, and consistent with his position regarding
the prosecution's higher burden of proof, the judge found the prosecution's evidence insuffi-
cient and acquitted the defendant. Id.
44. Kristen K. Sauer, Note, Informed Conviction: Instructing the Jury About Mandato-
ry Sentencing Consequences, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1232 (1995) (noting that in most
states jurors receive no information regarding the consequences of a guilty verdict).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Manning, 79 F.3d 212, 219 (1st Cir. 1996) (ruling that
attorneys may not provide information regarding the severity of the punishment in order to
induce jury nullification).
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In United States v. Greer,46 for example, a United States deputy mar-
shal conveyed to the jury information that indicated that the defendant
might be eligible to be sentenced under the Federal Youth Corrections
Act. The court found this information prejudicial because "if the jury is
convinced that a defendant will receive a light sentence, it may be tempt-
ed to convict on weaker evidence."47 A related strand of cases deals with
situations in which trial judges encourage hung juries to reach a guilty
verdict by assuring them that they will treat the defendant with leniency,
or by allowing the jury to recommend leniency. In one such case, United
States v. Glick,48 the trial judge informed a hung jury that they could rec-
ommend leniency as part of their verdict, and soon thereafter the jury
delivered a guilty verdict. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
overturned the conviction, noting that "one or more jurors entertaining
doubts as to appellants' guilt agreed to vote for conviction because [they
believed] they had it in their power to soothe their consciences by causing
little or no punishment to be imposed."'4 9
The combination of empirical and experimental findings, policymak-
ers' experience, judges' practices, and legal doctrine itself indicates that
the conventional presumption of a fixed standard of proof is misguided.
Instead, fact finders often adjust the evidentiary standard for conviction in
accordance with the severity of the punishment. As the next Part argues,
this behavioral pattern should be considered when designing criminal
punishments.
II. A THEORY OF PUNISHMENT AND INNOCENT DEFENDANTS
A large body of legal, economic, and philosophical literature con-
fronts the problem of setting the size of criminal sanctions. Scholars have
proposed several theories concerning the factors that should be considered
when determining the proper level of sanctions. While these different the-
ories offer competing rationales for punishing crime, their focal points
have been limited to the perpetrators of crime and their victims.
The prevailing paradigm among theories of punishment focuses on the
perpetrators of crime. In this context, two approaches have been particu-
larly dominant. Deontologists have often advocated that criminal
punishment should be based on retribution and just desert.50 Advocates of
this approach argue that the level of punishment should be calibrated to
46. 620 F.2d 1383, 1384 (10th Cir. 1980).
47. Greer, 620 F.2d at 1385.
48. 463 F.2d 491, 492 (2d Cir. 1972).
49. Glick, 463 F2d at 494 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Louie Gim
Hall, 245 F2d 338, 341 (2d Cir. 1957)); see also Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 40-41
(1975) (reversing guilty verdict after trial judge allowed jury to recommend he exercise "ex-
treme mercy").
50. See Bradley, supra note 7, at 22-26.
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the seriousness of the transgressor's crime.5 More specifically, the seri-
ousness of the crime should be determined by examining two primary
factors: the wrongfulness of the act and the culpability or accountability
of the perpetrator. 2 The first factor focuses on the moral quality of the act
itself,5 3 and the second denotes the degree of the offender's moral respon-
sibility.
54
Consequentialists, on the other hand, argue that punishing crime should
serve the goal of minimizing the social cost of crime.55 Proponents of this
theory have mostly focused on general deterrence as the mechanism through
which this policy goal can be achieved. 6 Punishment is viewed as a price
tag that the legal system sets for undesirable activity in order to discourage
potential transgressors from engaging in that activity.57 According to this
theory, the two main factors that should determine the size of the appropri-
ate punishment are the social harm created by the transgressor's acts and the
probability of punishing him.
58
Although retribution and deterrence theories seek to promote different
goals and often reach different conclusions regarding the desirable size of
penalties, they are similarly offender-centered.59 They both assume that
criminal punishment should be designed in response to the behavior of
actual and potential offenders. Recent legal scholarship, however, has sug-
gested that the offender-centered approach is incomplete. Determining just
desert and promoting the efficient prevention of harm also require consider-
ing victims' conduct. 60 Scholarship has thus shown that the desirable level
51. See ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 90
(1976) ("The principle of commensurate deserts calls for maintenance of a 'proportion' be-
tween the seriousness of the crime and the severity of the penalty.").
52. For a discussion of these two factors, see GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING
CRIMINAL LAW §§ 6.6-6.7, at 454-504 (1978).
53. See Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime To Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcrimi-
nalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533, 1551 (1997)
(referring to wrongfulness as "conduct that violates a moral norm or standard").
54. See id. at 1547 (referring to culpability as "the moral value attributed to a defend-
ant's state of mind during the commission of a crime").
55. See Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 292-94
(2002) (presenting the basic normative framework of welfare economics and punishment).
56. See, e.g., id. at 294 (noting that analysis will focus on deterrence).
57. See SHAVELL, supra note 7, at 473-530 (analyzing the deterrent effect of criminal
sanctions).
58. The argument that optimal punishment should be designed in order to account for
imperfect enforcement originates with Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic
Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
59. See George P. Fletcher, The Place of Victims in the Theory of Retribution, 3 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 51, 51 (1999) ("[T]he theory of criminal law has developed without paying
much attention to the place of victims in the analysis of responsibility or in the rationale for
punishment.").
60. For a review of the literature supporting this view, see Adam J. MacLeod, All for
One: A Review of Victim-Centric Justifications for Criminal Punishment, 13 BERKELEY J.
CRIM. L. 31 (2008).
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of punishment can actually be lower or higher than offender-centered theo-
ries suggest. For example, while punishment should be mitigated at times
in order to discourage victims from investing excessively in precautions
against crime,61 in other instances it should be aggravated in order to
promote an egalitarian distribution of risks among potential victims.
62
The differences between existing theories of punishment, however,
conceal a largely unnoticed consensus. Both offender-centered and vic-
tim-centered approaches confine the boundaries of the debate to the
parties who benefit and lose from criminal activity. While doing so, both
approaches ignore the possible effect of punishment on other parties.
More specifically, they overlook the implications that the size of sanctions
may have on innocent defendants, namely, those defendants whose guilt
cannot be proved by admissible and reliable evidence.
To be sure, the lack of attention to the effect of punishment size on in-
nocent defendants does not indicate indifference to the need to protect such
defendants. Both deontological and consequentialist approaches, whether
they focus on offenders or victims, view the conviction of innocent defend-
ants as an undesirable outcome. From a deontological perspective it is
morally impermissible to punish the innocent,63 and as just desert is a neces-
sary condition for punishment, penalizing the innocent violates a basic tenet
of retributivist theories. 4 From a consequentialist approach, penalizing the
innocent undercuts the goal of minimizing the social costs of crime. 65 If de-
fendants are punished even when they observe the law, incentives to comply
with legal rules are diluted and deterrence goals are undermined.
The existing theories of punishment view the rules of evidence and the
rules of criminal procedure-not the substantive rules of criminal law-as
the legal vessels charged with protecting innocent defendants. 66 Procedural
and evidentiary rules achieve this goal by controlling two key elements of the
litigation process. First, they regulate the quality of the evidence that will
affect the fact finders' determination. Second, they set the level of persuasion
61. See generally Omri Ben-Shahar & Alon Harel, The Economics of the Law of Crim-
inal Attempts: A Victim-Centered Perspective, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 299 (1996) (arguing that
the punishment for criminal attempt should be decreased in order to provide proper incen-
tives to victims).
62. See generally Alon Harel & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Hate and Equality, 109
YALE L.J. 507 (1999) (presenting a victim-centered rationale for hate crime legislation).
63. See, e.g., Michael Philips, The Inevitability of Punishing the Innocent, 48 PHIL.
STUD. 389, 389 (1985) ("It is widely held by moral philosophers that it is always wrong to
punish the innocent.").
64. See Joshua Dressier, Hating Criminals: How Can Something That Feels So Good
Be Wrong?, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1448, 1451 (1990) (book review) ("[J]ust deserts is a neces-
sary condition of punishment.").
65. See Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis,
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307, 348-52 (1994) (showing that letting guilty defendants go unpun-
ished and penalizing innocent defendants both undermine the goal of deterrence equally).
66. See Talia Fisher, The Boundaries of Plea Bargaining: Negotiating the Standard of
Proof 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 943, 977 (2007) ("The central objective of criminal
procedures and rules of evidence is to protect the innocent from wrongful conviction.").
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required to render a guilty verdict. Because of their direct bearing on the way
in which fact finders arrive at decisions, rules of evidence and criminal proce-
dure (rather than substantive criminal laws) are assumed to be the best
safeguards against the punishment of innocent defendants.67
The interdependent relationship between sanction size and the eviden-
tiary thresholds that fact finders apply, however, challenges the conventional
perception concerning the division of labor between substantive criminal
law and the rules of evidence and criminal procedure. Given fact finders'
behavior, substantive criminal law can also affect the quality of courts' deci-
sions. By increasing the size of the relevant sanction, the legal system may
elevate the standard of proof, thereby incentivizing fact finders to require
more evidence to substantiate a guilty verdict. To this extent, not only do
offenders and victims have a vested interest in the structure of criminal
sanctions, but innocent defendants do as well.
This insight does not merely underscore that substantive criminal law
has greater significance than conventionally assumed. It also highlights the
potential to use criminal sanctions as a means to protect defendants in situa-
tions where the rules of evidence and criminal procedure fail to provide that
protection. When fact finders disregard instructions as to the information
they may consider, or when they are required to make decisions in highly
uncertain cases, criminal sanctions can be an effective tool to reduce the risk
of erroneous decisions.
The analysis presented thus far does not suggest that the substantive
rules of criminal law should be structured exclusively to eliminate the risk
of wrongful convictions. Arguably, this goal could be achieved by adopting
a regime of extraordinarily harsh penalties that would raise the evidentiary
threshold to a level where it would be impossible to convict any defendant,
guilty or not. The challenge facing policymakers is to identify those areas of
law in which penalties can be structured in such a way that will defend the
innocent on one hand but not undermine the goals of punishment on the
other. The next Part elaborates on the legal system's ability to design such
penalties.
III. CRIMINAL SANCTIONS AND THE DETERMINATION
OF GUILT: APPLICATIONS
The preceding discussion presented in the abstract the argument that
criminal sanctions should be used to incentivize fact finders. Arguably, this
new perspective on punishment is subject to a wide range of criticisms. We
defer our discussion of these criticisms to the next Part of the Article in or-
der to describe first how penalties that are designed to incentivize fact
finders will operate in practice. This Part analyzes three concrete situations
in which the risk of convictions based on insufficient or inadmissible evi-
dence is significant. It shows that when direct regulation of the
fact-finding process is unlikely to be effective, the imposition of mandatory
67. See id.
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sanctions of sufficient size can often induce fact finders to determine guilt
appropriately.
A. The Law of Criminal Attempts
The analysis in this Section focuses on the punishment of criminal at-
tempts. While punishing attempts helps fight crime, it also increases the risk
of erroneous convictions. As criminal law scholarship has shown, the legal
system addresses this risk in two ways. One way is by setting stringent actus
reus requirements for conviction in attempt cases, which reduce the likeli-
hood of finding innocent defendants guilty. Another way is by establishing
that the sanction for attempt is more lenient than the sanction for a complete
crime, which diminishes the social costs of erroneous verdicts. Policymak-
ers, judges, and scholars have argued, however, that these solutions fail to
provide satisfactory results. Contrary to the conventional understanding, this
Section demonstrates the advantage of broadening actus reus requirements
and enhancing sanctions for attempts. Such a regime, it is shown, allows the
legal system to penalize defendants who intend to commit a crime while
simultaneously minimizing the risk of wrongful convictions.
1. The Problem of Uncertain Intentions
Most penal systems include an array of primary offenses and, in con-
junction with those offenses, a general inchoate crime that criminalizes
attempts to commit those offenses.68 Attempts can be divided into two cate-
gories: incomplete and complete.69 Incomplete attempts are situations in
which the transgressor fails to take all the steps that constitute the crime.
70
Punishing incomplete crimes thus requires defining the minimum behavior
that qualifies as an attempt. Legal systems distinguish between acts of
"preparation," which are legal (defendant bought a gun), and behaviors that
reach a more advanced stage, which qualify as criminal attempts (defend-
ant pointed a gun toward the victim and was caught before shooting).
7'
Complete attempts, by contrast, are situations in which the offender
committed all of the acts that constitute the crime, but his plan did not
succeed. Complete attempts fail to become full offenses either because the
offender does not succeed in bringing about the consequences that define
68. R.A. DUFF, CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS 1 (1996).
69. See ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 445-47 (5th ed. 2007)
(reviewing the two types of attempts).
70. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(l)(c) (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1985) (criminalizing acts that constitute only a substantial step toward the commission of a
crime).
71. For a review of Anglo-American case law on this point, see DUFF, supra note 68,
at 33-61; see also Hamish Stewart, The Centrality of the Act Requirement for Criminal At-
tempts, 51 U. TORONTO L.J. 399, 402-11 (2001).
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the full offense (defendant shot at his victim but missed)72 or because one
of the circumstances essential for completing the full offense did not exist
(defendant shot the victim, but he was already dead).73
Crininalizing attempts promotes two main policy goals. First, it serves
to enhance deterrence.74 Under a regime that punishes attempts, transgres-
sors are punished whether or not their plan succeeded.75 Penalizing attempts
thus raises the probability of punishment and thereby increases the expected
sanction that offenders face. 76 Moreover, raising the probability of punish-
ment by criminalizing attempts, rather than by other means (such as hiring
more policemen), is socially inexpensive since "opportunities to punish at-
tempts often arise as a by-product of society's investment to apprehend
parties who actually do cause harm.' ' 77 A rule that allows the police to ap-
prehend not only successful burglars but also unsuccessful ones does not
increase police operating costs, yet can significantly increase the likelihood
of apprehension. Criminalizing attempts, therefore, weakens potential trans-
gressors' incentives to engage in criminal activity.
Second, to the extent that transgressors are not deterred and still choose
to engage in illicit behavior, punishing attempts helps prevent harm. Such
prevention is achieved both through police intervention prior to the comple-
tion of the criminal act and through incapacitation of individuals who
demonstrate a propensity for criminal activity.78 Consider, for example, an
assassin who is about to shoot his victim. Criminalizing attempted murder
enables the police to arrest the assassin before he fires the lethal bullet,
thereby thwarting the materialization of the harm. Alternatively, if the assas-
sin shoots and misses the victim, it enables the legal system to incapacitate
him (through incarceration) such that he will be unable to complete the
crime in the future.
While punishing attempts is beneficial from a crime control perspective,
it generates a considerable risk of wrongful convictions when compared to
the punishment of complete crimes. Criminal attempts always involve situa-
tions in which at least one of the objective elements of the crime is absent.
79
This, in turn, leaves fact finders to conjecture about the missing elements
72. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(b) (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1985).
73. See, e.g., id. § 5.01(l)(a).
74. See generally Steven Shavell, Deterrence and the Punishment of Attempts, 19 J.
LEGAL STUD. 435 (1990).
75. Id. at 436-37.
76. Id.
77. Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as
a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1232, 1250 (1985).
78. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 11.2(b) (5th ed. 2010) (analyzing crimi-
nal attempt from the perspective of early prevention); Shavell, supra note 74, at 458
(analyzing criminal attempts from the perspective of incapacitation).
79. Arnold N. Enker, Impossibility in Criminal Attempts-Legality and the Legal Pro-
cess, 53 MINN. L. REV. 665, 673 (1969).
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and increases the likelihood of erroneous determinations.80 This is especially
true with respect to incomplete attempts, in which there is uncertainty as to
the defendant's actual act. The insight also holds true with respect to com-
plete attempts, since the lack of harm might raise doubts as to the
defendant's true intentions. The commentators of the American Law Insti-
tute alluded to this aspect of criminal attempts, noting that criminalizing any
act taken toward the completion of a crime "would allow prosecutions for
acts that are externally equivocal and thus create a risk that innocent persons
would be convicted."
81
More specifically, uncertainty in attempt cases can arise in one of three
ways. First, it might not be evident whether the defendant intended to com-
mit any crime. For example, in the case where the defendant shot at the
victim but did not inflict any harm, fact finders might not be able to deter-
mine with sufficient certainty whether the defendant truly intended to shoot
the victim or was only engaged in legal hunting and mistakenly fired toward
the victim. 82 Second, even if the defendant clearly has an illicit intention, it
might be impossible to decipher the actual offense the defendant intended to
commit. For instance, fact finders might not be able to decide unequivocally
whether the defendant intended to kill the victim or only to frighten him. 83
Finally, even if it is possible to identify the defendant's initial intention, it
might still be uncertain whether the defendant would have had the resolve to
execute the crime. For example, in a case in which the defendant was caught
prior to actually shooting, fact finders might not be able to determine
whether he would have voluntarily retracted before completing the crime. 4
Criminalizing attempts thus creates a tension between the desire to re-
duce crime and the need to protect innocent defendants. Expanding the
boundaries of attempt doctrine enhances the benefits the legal system can
derive from making inchoate crimes punishable. At the same time, however,
it increases the risk of convicting innocent defendants.
2. Reducing Error Costs in Incomplete Offenses
As mentioned, the legal system employs two tools in order to deal
with the increased risk of wrongful convictions created by criminalizing
attempts. The first focuses on the probability of mistaken convictions, and
aims to minimize it by narrowly structuring the rules of attempt law. With
respect to incomplete attempts, stringent requirements have often been
80. See id. at 670-76.
81. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.0l(5)(f) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
82. See Jerome Hall, Criminal Attempt-A Study of Foundations of Criminal Liability,
49 YALE L.J. 789, 824 (1940) (alluding to the problem and noting that "[a] person carries a
gun in his possession. Is his purpose to defend himself, to hunt or to kill a man?").
83. See id. at 824-25 (noting that when a person puts his hand into another person's
pocket he might have a lewd or a larcenous purpose).
84. See ASHWORTH, supra note 69, at 446 (noting the uncertainty associated with
retraction since "it may take greater nerve to do the final act which triggers the actual harm
than to do the preliminary acts").
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applied regarding the actus reus element. Under these requirements, a de-
fendant's conduct will be considered an "attempt"-rather than merely
"preparation"-only if it approximated the advanced stages of executing the
crime. Courts have tailored tests such as "dangerous proximity to success"
and "near to accomplishment" in order to ensure that only defendants who
manifest an unequivocal intent to commit the offense will be penalized. 85
Scholars analyzing this body of case law acknowledge the evidentiary pur-
pose underlying these tests, noting that "the preparation-attempt distinction
is the result of difficulty in proving purpose.
86
While the risk of wrongful convictions is relatively smaller in cases in-
volving complete attempts, courts have also narrowed the attempt definition
in these cases so as to reduce the risk of errors. For example, in the well-
known decision in United States v. Oviedo,87 the district court convicted the
defendant of attempted distribution of heroin despite the fact that the sub-
stance in question turned out not to be an illegal substance, The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit overturned this conviction, and expressed its
concern that the lack of objective elements in attempt cases will lead to con-
victions based on "speculation and abuse." 88 The court adopted a strict
definition of the acts that constitute attempt, and required that "the objective
acts performed, without any reliance on the accompanying mens rea, mark
the defendant's conduct as criminal in nature."89
The second way in which the legal system minimizes the error costs as-
sociated with criminalizing attempts is by diminishing the harm of wrongful
convictions, rather than by reducing their likelihood. Most legal systems,
both within the United States and abroad, have traditionally punished at-
tempts less severely than completed crimes.9" The accepted practice among
many jurisdictions in this regard is to punish an attempt with half of the
sanction that is attached to the completed crime. 91 Although it is difficult to
justify this practice from the perspective of optimal deterrence and harm
prevention, scholars have emphasized the need to adjust the level of pun-
ishment to account for the significant risk of erroneous convictions. As
85. See, e.g., Gaskin v. State, 31 S.E. 740, 741 (Ga. 1898) (distinguishing between
mere preparation and an attempt to commit a crime); Commonwealth v. Kelley, 58 A.2d 375,
376 (Pa. 1948) (noting that an attempt must be sufficiently proximate to the intended crime).
86. Herbert Wechsler et al., The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the Model Penal
Code of the American Law Institute: Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy, 61 COLUM. L.
REV. 571, 591 (1961).
87. 525 F.2d 881 (1976).
88. Oviedo, 525 F.2d at 885.
89. Id.
90. See Ben-Shahar & Harel, supra note 61, at 318-19 & n.44 (reviewing the punish-
ment for attempts in different jurisdictions).
91. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 664 (West 2011) (determining-subject to a few
qualifications-that a person convicted of attempt "shall be punished by imprisonment in the
state prison or in a county jail, respectively, for one-half the term of imprisonment prescribed
upon a conviction of the offense attempted"); Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46,
s. 463 (providing that the punishment for attempt is "one-half of the longest term to which a
person who is guilty of [the complete] offence is liable").
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Judge Posner argues, attempts should be punished less severely "since there
is a higher probability that an attempter really is harmless. '9 2 The law and
economics literature has elaborated on this insight and demonstrated the
benefits of such discounting.93 Because courts possess incomplete infor-
mation in attempt cases both with respect to the actual intention of the
offender and the potential harm, the imposition of a mitigated sanction al-
lows the legal system to reduce the costs of erroneous judgments. 94
Notwithstanding the legal system's efforts to minimize the probability
and costs of erroneous decisions in attempt cases, the existing rules have
been subject to much criticism. Legal scholarship has highlighted how the
current doctrine of criminal attempt is both underinclusive and overinclu-
sive. On the one hand, it enables defendants to escape liability, even when
the evidence against them is overwhelming. On the other hand, despite the
adoption of safeguards against wrongful convictions, the current doctrine
nevertheless fails to protect innocent defendants adequately.
The problem of underinclusiveness, as both courts and policymakers have
emphasized, stems from the stringent actus reus requirements aimed to
decrease the probability of wrongful convictions. While these requirements
reduce the risk of penalizing innocent defendants, they also prevent the
punishment of defendants who clearly intended to execute the crime. This
concern is most apparent in the context of incomplete attempts. Even if the
evidence regarding their intention is clear, when defendants are caught before
executing a significant part of their illicit behavior, the existing rules of
criminal attempt make conviction impossible. As Professors Bierschbach and
Stein recently noted, defendants "go free under the various tests for attempt
not because there is any question about their intent to commit a crime or the
harm they stood to cause, but simply because they were apprehended at too
early a point in the process."9
An illustrative example can be found in a recent case involving child
abuse. In State v. Duke,9 6 the defendant solicited a twelve-year-old girl to
engage in sexual acts through an internet chat room. Unbeknownst to the
92. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
1193, 1217-18 (1985).
93. See, e.g., Shavell, supra note 74, at 452-55 (arguing that punishment of incom-
plete crimes should be mitigated as a means to reduce error costs).
94. Among deontologists, the imposition of mitigated sanctions for incomplete crimes
is sometimes justified on retribution grounds. According to this understanding, since incom-
plete crimes do not result in actual harm they involve a lower degree of moral
blameworthiness. See, e.g., Leo Katz, Why the Successful Assassin Is More Wicked Than the
Unsuccessful One, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 791, 794-811 (2000). Yet the intensified risk of error
characterizing attempt cases has also been recognized by deontologists as a rationale for
lowering the punishment for attempts. See, e.g., David Enoch & Andrei Marmor, The Case
Against Moral Luck, 26 LAw & PHIL. 405, 415-16 (2007). Our analysis thus applies both to
deontologist and consequentialist approaches that advocate downward adjustment of the
punishment to account for the risk of wrongful conviction.
95. Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Mediating Rules in Criminal Law, 93 VA. L.
REV. 1197, 1238 (2007).
96. 709 So. 2d 580 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
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defendant, the "girl" was actually a detective searching for child molesters.
The defendant and the detective arranged to meet at a parking lot. When the
defendant arrived at their meeting point, he was arrested and later accused
of attempted sexual battery. The appellate court, although convinced by the
evidence regarding the defendant's intention to carry out the offense, ren-
dered a not-guilty verdict on the grounds that the defendant's act did not go
far enough to meet the actus reus requirements. The court referred to the
overrestrictiveness of these requirements and called on the legislature to
remedy this problem.
97
The concern regarding the underinclusiveness of the current criminal-
attempt doctrine has similarly led to proposals for legislative reforms in
England. In R. v. Geddes,9" the twenty-nine-year-old defendant had been
found in the boys' lavatory at a school equipped with a large knife, some
lengths of rope, and a roll of masking tape. The defendant was charged with
attempted false imprisonment. Overruling the lower court's decision, the
court of appeal-"with the gravest unease"-found the defendant's acts
merely preparatory and rendered a not-guilty verdict. 99 A recent Royal
Commission report responded to this decision by recommending significant
expansion of the scope of criminal attempt law by adopting a more compre-
hensive definition of the actus reus requirement."°°
While the application of strict actus reus tests has created insufficient
criminal liability, it has also been suggested that these tests only partially
resolve the problem of wrongful convictions. As legal scholarship has
demonstrated, possessing additional knowledge about defendants' conduct
does not always enable fact finders to discover their actual intentions.
Therefore, even under the most stringent actus reus standards, innocent de-
fendants may still face a significant risk of conviction. 01
97. Duke, 709 So. 2d at 582. For additional examples of cases in which defendants
engaging in illicit behavior were not convicted due to the fact that they did not take a "sub-
stantial step" toward the commission of the crime, see United States v. Harper, 33 F.3d 1143,
1147-48 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the defendants had not taken a substantial step toward
robbing a bank when they sat in a car outside of a bank at 10:00 p.m. equipped with two
handguns, ammunition, a roll of duct tape, a stun gun, and a pair of latex surgical gloves, and
had tampered with the bank's ATM in order to draw service personnel to the bank), and
United States v. Still, 850 F.2d 607, 608 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the defendant had not
taken substantial steps toward robbing a bank where he sat in a car near a bank wearing a
blond wig and carrying a fake bomb, a pouch with a demand note taped to it, a police scan-
ner, and a notebook containing drafts of demand notes; even where he later confessed that
the police caught him "five minutes before he was going to rob a bank").
98. (1996) 160 J.P. 697 (Eng.).
99. Geddes, 160 J.P. at 705-06.
100. LAW COMM'N, CONSPIRACY AND ATTEMPTS 19 (2007) (Consultation Paper No.
183) (U.K.) (offering to expand the definition of criminal attempt and concluding that "the
very narrow reading of the 1981 Act... has given rise to decisions such as Geddes").
101. See Lawrence Crocker, Justice in Criminal Liability: Decriminalizing Harmless
Attempts, 53 OHIo ST. L.J. 1057, 1088 (1992) (criticizing existing doctrine and arguing that
attempt liability should be attached only to the "last act that imposes sufficient objective
risk"); Lawrence Crocker, Justification and Bad Motives, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRiM. L. 277, 287
n.22 (2008) (describing current attempt doctrine as overly inclusive).
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As noted, criminal attempt cases involve three types of uncertainty. With
respect to the first-the intention to commit a crime-the application of
stringent actus reus requirements may indeed reduce the likelihood of incor-
rect judgments. The determination whether the defendant's intention is legal
is likely to become easier as the defendant takes additional steps towards her
goal.
The focus on the defendant's conduct, however, will often provide no
guidance with respect to the two other forms of uncertainty. In the context
of the second type of uncertainty-the actual offense intended-the behav-
ior of the defendant might be similar across various possible offenses.
Consequently, even in cases in which the defendant completed her conduct,
the court might wrongfully convict her of a crime she never intended to
commit. To illustrate, consider the case of a defendant who maliciously shot
at another individual while not causing any physical harm. Clearly, such an
act satisfies the most stringent actus reus requirements, as the defendant
took the last step toward the completion of a crime. Nonetheless, the
potential for error is still substantial, since different possible crimes-
assault (frightening the victim), attempted battery (injuring the victim),
and attempted murder (killing the victim)-are all consistent with the
actual behavior of the defendant (shooting at the victim).
Similarly, even the most stringent actus reus requirements cannot re-
solve the third form of uncertainty-the possibility of retraction. A criminal
may withdraw from her plan at any stage where, according to these re-
quirements, her acts already constitute an attempt. As Professors Dubber
and Kelman point out, retraction can occur even after the criminal took the
last step toward completing the crime. 10 2 Dubber and Kelman illustrate this
point with their example of the "metaphoric slow fuse."'13 In this example,
the defendant has lit a fuse that will cause a fire, but the fuse will bum for
hours before actually igniting the fire. While this defendant completed her
illicit behavior by lighting the fuse, given the interval between her con-
duct and the materialization of harm, she is still capable of retracting her
plan (e.g., by stepping on the fuse).
Legal scholarship has therefore demonstrated how criminal attempt law
is deficient in both directions; it is simultaneously underinclusive and over-
inclusive. The conventional regime-application of stringent actus reus
requirements along with mitigated sanctions-may prevent punishing crim-
inals even when the evidence against them is clear. However, it also leads to
the conviction of individuals even when the evidence regarding their guilt is
insufficient. From a policymaking perspective, these deficiencies seem to
mandate two contradictory changes. On the one hand, the legal system must
expand liability in criminal attempt cases in order to address the problem of
underinclusiveness. On the other hand, it must also make the standard of
liability more stringent to address the problem of overinclusiveness. These
102. MARKUS D. DUBBER & MARK G. KELMAN, AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW: CASES,




seemingly contradictory changes both become possible, though, once the
effect of increased sanctions on evidentiary thresholds is incorporated into
the theory of criminal attempt. It provides that switching the current re-
gime-that is, applying broad (rather than stringent) actus reus tests and
imposing full (rather than mitigated) sanctions-will enable the legal system
to address both deficiencies.
The problem of underinclusiveness, as demonstrated earlier, results from
a narrow definition of what behavior constitutes a criminal attempt (as
opposed to merely a preparatory act). Modifying this definition such that
it encompasses a larger set of fact patterns will broaden criminal attempt
liability to include cases that the current regime does not permit. A more
expansive definition will remove the obstacle to penalizing defendants
who are caught at an early stage of their conduct but demonstrate a clear
intent to complete a crime. Once the actus reus element no longer requires a
nearly completed crime, courts will be able to convict Geddes-like defend-
ants.
The drawback of the proposed expansive approach is the increased risk
of wrongful convictions. Courts might reach an erroneous conclusion re-
garding the defendant's guilt in cases in which they possess limited
information about his actual behavior. This increased risk, however, can be
offset by augmenting the size of the applicable sanction. Because fact find-
ers elevate the evidentiary threshold in accordance with the severity of the
punishment, the imposition of a more significant punishment will be fol-
lowed by an upward adjustment in the burden of proof. Under this elevated
standard, evidence with greater probative strength will be required for con-
viction. Thus, while a broad definition of criminal attempt will enable fact
finders to convict defendants who are caught at an early stage, the fact find-
ers will do so only if sufficient evidence demonstrates that those defendants
intended to execute the crime.
Elevating the sanction for criminal attempts similarly addresses the
overinclusiveness concern. As noted, even if the legal system applies strin-
gent actus reus requirements, there still remains significant uncertainty with
respect to both the actual crime intended by the defendant and the possibil-
ity of retraction. Consequently, the law of criminal attempt is particularly
susceptible to unjustified guilty verdicts. The likelihood of such erroneous
decisions, however, depends on the evidentiary standards that fact finders
apply. The higher the standards, the less likely fact finders are to convict a
defendant in the absence of sufficient evidence. In the shooting hypothet-
ical, fact finders will be more inclined to find the defendant guilty of
attempted murder (rather than merely assault or attempted battery) if the
applicable sanction for that crime is lenient. In the same manner, fact finders
who are unsure whether the defendant would have retracted will be more
likely to convict if the punishment for attempt is reduced. Increasing the
punishment for criminal attempt thus diminishes the likelihood of error.
The interdependence of the size of sanctions and evidentiary standards
also suggests that the problem of overinclusiveness might be exacerbated by
the current practice of mitigated sanctions for criminal attempts. Thus, con-
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trary to Posner's theory and subsequent law and economics literature,1on
reducing the sanction for attempts might be a counterproductive way of
minimizing the error costs associated with punishing incomplete crimes.
Posner's analysis, following the conventional perception, assumes that the
punishment for attempt can be set while holding the probability of error
constant. In reality, however, these two variables-the size of punishment
and the risk of error-are inversely related. To this extent, Posner's
approach reduces the costs of wrongful convictions but simultaneously
increases their likelihood. A more effective approach might endeavor to
minimize the risk of error by raising the evidentiary threshold for convic-
tion. If the effect on fact finders is sufficiently large, raising the sanction
level can reduce the costs associated with wrongful convictions by lowering
their occurrence.
The preceding analysis regarding the desirable structure of attempt law
is supported by recent legal developments. First, reforms concerning the
actus reus requirement have broadened the definition of what behavior con-
stitutes attempt. A representative example is the definition proposed by the
Model Penal Code ("MPC"). Under the MPC, a defendant can be convicted
of a criminal attempt if he took "a substantial step in a course of conduct
planned to culminate in his commission of the crime."105 The MPC, as
commentators emphasize, "shifts the focus of attempt law from what re-
mains to be done ... to what the actor has already done. ' 10 6 The motivation
for this shift is to "broaden the scope of attempt liability."'' 7
A second emerging development can be observed with respect to sen-
tencing policies. While traditionally the punishment for an incomplete
offense was lower than the punishment for the consummated offense, in
recent years a number of reforms have been proposed that aim to increase
the punishment for attempt. The MPC, for example, provides that the pun-
ishment for criminal attempt is "of the same grade and degree" as the
execution of the completed crime. 108 Several jurisdictions, both within the
United States and abroad, have followed the MPC's approach and equalized
the punishment for complete and incomplete offenses. 109
104. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
105. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(c) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
106. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 409 (3d ed. 2001).
107. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(6)(a) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985).
108. Id. § 5.05(1).
109. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-51 (West 2007) (providing that attempt is a
crime "of the same grade and degree as the most serious offense which is attempted"); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 531 (West 2001) (providing that "[a]ttempt to commit a crime is an offense
of the same grade and degree as the most serious offense which the accused is found guilty of
attempting"); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 705-502 (LexisNexis 2007) (providing that attempt is
a crime "of the same grade and degree as the most serious offense which is attempted"); IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-41-5-1(a) (West 2004) (providing that an "attempt to commit a crime is a
felony or misdemeanor of the same class as the crime attempted"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 629: 1(IV) (West 2007) (providing that the "penalty for attempt is the same as that author-
ized for the crime that was attempted"). England also adopted an equal sanction regime in
1981. See Criminal Attempts Act, 1981, c. 47, § 4(1)(b) (Eng. & Wales) (providing that a
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While these developments are seemingly unrelated, the preceding analy-
sis suggests that they complement one another. The first trend expands the
basis of liability for incomplete offenses; the second adjusts the burden of
proof upward to avoid overexpansion. Coupled together, both trends enable
the legal system to address the high risk of wrongful convictions in criminal
attempts while also maintaining an effective crime control policy.
B. The Right to Silence
The value of using sanctions to incentivize fact finders is not limited to
situations in which the risk of erroneous convictions stems from the lack of
sufficient evidence regarding defendants' actual acts and intentions. This
Section extends the analysis to situations where choices made by the de-
fendant during her trial create a bias that increases the likelihood of an
unsubstantiated conviction. It establishes that the rules of evidence and
criminal procedure alone cannot protect defendants from such biases, and
that mandatory sanctions of sufficient size can be harnessed to strengthen
defendants' rights at trial.
In a landmark decision, the Supreme Court in Griffin v. California"1
ruled that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination prohib-
its fact finders from inferring guilt from defendants' silence. The Court
reasoned that allowing such an inference would "cut[] down on the privilege
by making its assertion costly."' In Mitchell v. United States,1 2 the Court
expanded Griffin and held that the right to silence applies to the sentencing
stage of the criminal process as well. Thus, under the current doctrine,
defendants who remain silent cannot be subjected to a harsher punishment
than defendants who testify. "
3
This Section demonstrates that, contrary to the Court's assumption, im-
posing a harsher sanction on defendants who do not testify actually
strengthens the right to silence. Notwithstanding Griffin, evidence shows
that fact finders exhibit a bias against silent defendants. Because they expect
the innocent to take the stand, fact finders assign probative weight to de-
fendants' refusals to testify. Against this backdrop, the following analysis
explores the implication of punishing defendants who choose to remain si-
lent. It shows that if silence is rendered costly, fact finders will demand
person convicted of attempt shall be subject "to any penalty to which he would have been
liable on conviction on indictment of [the complete] offense").
110. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
11. Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614.
112. 526 U.S. 314, 330 (1999) (holding that it is impermissible to impose a "burden on
the exercise of the constitutional right against compelled self-incrimination").
113. In Mitchell, the defendant admitted to distributing cocaine. During the sentencing
stage, however, the defendant refused to testify to refute the testimony of a coconspirator
regarding the actual amount she had sold. In a five-to-four decision, the Court ruled that no
adverse inference could be made from her silence. Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 317-28. The majori-
ty also refused to declare that a defendant's silence can be used against her in the context of
section 3El .1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which allows a downward adjustment in
sanctions if the defendant accepts responsibility and demonstrates remorse. Id. at 330.
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more evidence to convict silent defendants. Punishing defendants' silence
thus offsets the bias against silent defendants and restores the power of the
privilege against self-incrimination.
1. Inferring Guilt from Defendants' Refusals to Testify
The right to silence, in its current form, allows defendants to avoid
taking the stand at no cost."l 4 Even when silence appears to indicate guilt,
triers of fact are prohibited from assigning probative value to a defend-
ant's preference not to testify. This prohibition, as the Supreme Court has
emphasized many times, manifests the accusatorial structure of the crimi-
nal process-the requirement that the prosecution establish its case
through its "own independent labors."' 15
Despite the clear rule on the matter, fact finders have been shown to
respond negatively to parties' decisions not to testify. Scholars analyzing
fact finders' behavior in the context of the right to silence have argued
that "evidence [indicates] that juries tend to look unfavorably upon those
who choose not to testify and that, prosecutorial silence and judicial ad-
monitions notwithstanding, they tend to factor in the refusal to testify
when deciding whether to convict or acquit."'"I6
Jurors' (and to a lesser degree, judges') difficulties in disregarding inad-
missible yet probative information has been documented in a long line of
studies." 7 Researchers have shown that attempts to induce jurors to overcome
this tendency have been rather ineffective. Clear and specific instructions to
disregard such evidence or the provision of detailed explanations regarding
the relevant evidentiary rules usually fail to induce jurors to fully ignore
inadmissible information when making their decision.II
114. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 2.10(b) (3d ed.
2007) (discussing the rule against drawing adverse inferences from defendants' silence).
115. Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 213 n.l (1988); see also LAFAVE ET AL.,
supra note 114, § 2.10(d) (arguing that the "accusatorial" rationale is the Court's most com-
mon explanation for the right to silence); infra note 146 (discussing other justifications for
the right to silence).
116. Michael S. Green, The Privilege's Last Stand: The Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination and the Right To Rebel Against the State, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 627, 642-43
(1999).
117. See Saul M. Kassin & Christina A. Studebaker, Instructions To Disregard and the
Jury: Curative and Paradoxical Effects, in INTENTIONAL FORGETTING: INTERDISCIPLINARY
APPROACHES, 413, 413-34 (Jonathan M. Golding & Colin M. MacLeod eds., 1998) (con-
cluding that juries often fail to disregard probative information that was obtained illegally,
even when explicitly instructed about admissibility rules). For a comprehensive study regard-
ing judges' ability (or inability) to disregard inadmissible evidence, see Andrew J. Wistrich
et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disre-
garding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (2005) (presenting results of several experiments in which
professional judges were only partly able to disregard inadmissible evidence).
118. See Joel D. Lieberman & Jamie Arndt, Understanding the Limits of Limiting In-
structions: Social Psychological Explanations for the Failures of Instructions To Disregard
Pretrial Publicity and Other Inadmissible Evidence, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 677, 703
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More specifically, researchers have demonstrated that invocation of the
right to silence is frequently interpreted by fact finders as evidence of guilt.
In a series of post-Griffin studies, Professor Shaffer and his colleagues pre-
sented mock jurors with evidence regarding the possible involvement of
defendants in certain crimes.119 Jurors were divided into two groups, both of
which reviewed the same evidence. The only difference between the groups
involved the defendant's decision whether to testify. In one group, the de-
fendant testified and provided a possible explanation for the incriminating
evidence. In the second group, this explanation was provided via a friend's
testimony, while the defendant himself invoked the Fifth Amendment. 120 In
another version of these experiments, participants in one group were told
that the defendant denied the allegation but refused to testify, whereas in the
other group the defendant took the stand but his testimony included only a
general denial (thus providing no other information). 121 In both experiments,
the researchers found a clear bias against silent defendants: "[T]his bias
against defendants who invoked the Fifth Amendment was apparent even
though the judge had affirmed the defendant's right to so plead and had in-
structed jurors that they were to draw no inferences about the defendant's
innocence or guilt from his use of this constitutional privilege."'
122
Studies applying a qualitative rather than quantitative analysis have con-
firmed Shaffer's results. Professors Hans and Vidmar interviewed a large
group of participants regarding their attitudes about various aspects of the
evidentiary and trial processes. 23 Among their research topics, Hans and
Vidmar explored participants' perceptions of criminal defendants who
choose not to testify. 24 Based on participants' replies, Hans and Vidmar
concluded that "exercising the right against self incrimination is not viewed
favorably. 'Taking the Fifth' is, to some, an apparently odious and self-
incriminating act."'125 Shaffer and his colleagues obtained similar results
when, as part of their study, they documented and analyzed mock jury de-
liberations. According to their findings, "80 percent of the comments made
about the defendant's refusal to take the stand were negative in their impli-
cation."1
26
(2000) ("[Tlhe majority of extant empirical research indicates that jurors do not adhere to
limiting instructions.").
119. David R. Shaffer, The Defendant's Testimony, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE
AND TRIAL PROCEDURE 124, 140-45 (Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman eds., 1985)
(summarizing the experiments' formats and results).
120. Id. at 141-42. Both testimonies-the defendant's and the friend's-were given to
the participants in a written format, thus negating the possibility that the gap in the groups'
assessments stemmed from a difference in the witnesses' testimonial skills or other personal
characteristics.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 143.
123. VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 144 (1986).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Shaffer, supra note 119, at 143.
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Statistical data regarding the right to silence, although rather limited,
provide further support of the existence of a bias against silent defendants.
Professor Werner and her colleagues, conducting an archival analysis of
over 200 criminal cases, found a positive correlation between defendants'
silence and guilty verdicts.127 Researchers have also argued that the signifi-
cant percentage of defendants who choose not to invoke the privilege shows
their lack of trust that jurors would respect their right to remain silent.
1 28
Taking the stand is a risky strategy, particularly if the defendant has a prior
record (as evidence regarding prior convictions can become admissible in
light of the defendant's testimony). Nevertheless, studies have shown that
nearly 50 percent or more of defendants with a prior record opt not to in-
voke their privilege to remain silent.1 29 Such behavior becomes sensible,
however, if fact finders indeed assign a significant probative value to de-
fendants' refusals to testify. Given this practice, taking the stand might be
the lesser of two evils.
Perhaps the clearest indication of the existence of a bias against silent
defendants in American courts is a 2003 comprehensive survey of actual
jurors in criminal cases where defendants invoked the privilege. 130 In their
study, Professors Frank and Broschard, with the assistance of presiding
judges, collected reports regarding juror experiences during trial from nearly
1,000 jurors immediately after they had delivered verdicts.131 Based on these
reports, Frank and Broschard found that:
[M]ore than one third, 38.3%, discussed what they were told they should
"[never] be concerned" with [the defendant's silence]. Roughly one in five
admitted either that it mattered to the jury that the defendant did not testify




127. Werner et al., supra note 12, at 414.
128. See, e.g., Green, supra note 116, at 642 n.51 (discussing Kalven and Zeisel's Chi-
cago Jury Study according to which nearly 74 percent of defendants with prior records
choose to testify and arguing that this high rate "suggests that jurors draw adverse inferences
from silence").
129. See Gordon Van Kessel, Quieting the Guilty and Acquitting the Innocent: A Close
Look at a New Twist on the Right to Silence, 35 IND. L. REV. 925, 950-51 (2002) (reviewing
studies exploring the rate of silence among defendants and concluding that the "extent of
refusal to testify varies from one-third to over one-half'). A recent study, using data from
over 300 criminal trials in four large counties, found that the rate of defendants, with and
without prior convictions, who testify in their trial was 45 percent and 62 percent, respective-
ly. See Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand: The
Effect of a Prior Criminal Record on the Decision To Testify and on Trial Outcomes, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 1353, 1371 (2009).
130. Mitchell J. Frank & Dawn Broschard, The Silent Criminal Defendant and the Pre-
sumption of Innocence: In the Hands of Real Jurors, Is Either of Them Safe?, 10 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 237 (2006).
131. Id. at 240-43 (describing the survey's format).
132. Id. at 265 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted).
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Frank and Broschard also examined the actual influence of jurors' biases on
silent defendants' chances of being convicted. 133 Their analysis showed that
"[d]efendants who exercised their Fifth-Amendment privilege were clear-
ly in jeopardy as a result." 3I Since the survey involved self-reporting, and
considering the likely reluctance of some jurors to admit that they did not
follow the court's instructions, it is likely that the rate of fact finders who
associate silence with guilt is even greater than that indicated by the
survey's results.
Given the fundamental status of the Fifth Amendment privilege in
guarding defendants' rights, the tendency of fact finders to disregard this
privilege raises a challenge. The legal system must facilitate the conviction
of defendants in cases where sufficient inculpating evidence exists, yet it must
also protect silent defendants from unsubstantiated convictions. The failure of
judicial instructions to induce compliance with the privilege suggests that
tinkering with conventional procedural and evidentiary rules is unlikely to
resolve the problem. As the next Section shows, however, redesigning the
relevant substantive criminal law rules can provide an effective solution.
2. The Virtue of Punishing Silence
Legal analysis has shown that defendants' actual benefits from Griffin
depends on the evidentiary circumstances. 35 In some cases, defendants will
choose to remain silent even if the law does not prohibit inferring guilt from
such behavior. In other instances, defendants will opt to testify even if a nega-
tive inference is explicitly prohibited. In a third group of cases, defendants'
decisions to testify directly hinge on whether the law allows or prohibits draw-
ing a negative inference from their silence. This analysis provides a
framework that identifies when fact finders' disregard of Griffin is most likely
to harm defendants. Such a framework also allows for an exploration of the
implications of penalizing defendants' silence.
The advantage that defendants derive from Griffin has been shown to be
contingent on two primary factors. First, and rather intuitively, the rule
against adverse inference plays no role when defendants' self-exonerating
accounts serve to effectively refute the charges against them. In such cases,
it is in the self-interest of the defendant to talk. Griffin only becomes im-
portant when defendants-whether innocent or guilty-expect their
testimony (and the subsequent cross-examination) to substantiate the
prosecution's allegations. The Fifth Amendment privilege enables such
133. Id. at 268.
134. Id. at 264.
135. See Daniel J. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A
Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 HARV. L. REV. 430, 467-70
(2000) (showing that the significance of the rule against adverse inference from silence de-
pends on the relative strength of the prosecution's evidence); Alex Stein, The Right to
Silence Helps the Innocent: A Response to Critics, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1115, 1118-22
(2008) (demonstrating the implications of the right to silence under various evidentiary
circumstances).
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defendants to remain silent at no cost. Second, and more interestingly, the
no-negative-inference rule has no bearing on a defendant's decision
whether to testify in cases in which the incriminating evidence against her
is either weak or strong.136 In both of these extreme cases, defendants'
behavior at trial will not be affected by the existence (or the absence) of
the rule. Only when the prosecution's evidence is of intermediate strength
will defendants be influenced by the availability of a right to silence.
37
Consider initially the case in which the prosecution's evidence is weak. As
legal analysis has emphasized, defendants who are afraid of self-
incrimination "can remain silent even in the absence of a privilege against
adverse inferences."' 38 This is because the combination of "[w]eak inculpa-
tory evidence and [a] silent defendanti" will usually be insufficient to
support a guilty verdict. 139 Fact finders are unlikely to find a silent defendant
guilty if the prosecution cannot provide any evidence connecting this de-
fendant to the alleged crime. As such, when the prosecution's case is weak,
defendants who desire to avoid testifying will remain silent whether or not a
privilege exists.
Legal scholarship has similarly shown that the privilege plays "no sig-
nificant role in cases in which the evidence inculpating the defendant is
overwhelming."' 4 When the prosecution has sufficient evidentiary material
to prove guilt, the defendant's behavior-testifying or remaining silent-has
no bearing on the court's decision. Even if silence is protected such that a
negative inference is prohibited, it cannot prevent a guilty verdict, consider-
ing the weight of the prosecution's evidence. In the same vein, taking the
stand-and thereby corroborating, through self-incrimination, the already
convincing inculpating evidence-also has no effect on the trial outcome.
Consequently, in strong cases, irrespective of whether the privilege is avail-
able, defendants are indifferent whether to testify or remain silent.
While the privilege provides no benefit to defendants wishing to avoid
testifying in both weak and strong cases, it turns critical when the probative
strength of the inculpating evidence lies somewhere in between. 4' In inter-
mediate cases, the prosecution's evidence alone cannot prove guilt, but
becomes sufficiently decisive once corroborated by the defendant's silence.
Absent a no-negative-inference rule, defendants in intermediate cases are
trapped between a rock and a hard place. Remaining silent will corroborate
the prosecution's intermediate evidence and result in conviction; taking the
stand will lead to self-incrimination. In contrast to the weak and strong
cases, in intermediate cases the Fifth Amendment privilege provides a sig-
nificant benefit to defendants. By prohibiting fact finders from drawing an
136. Seidmann & Stein, supra note 135, at 467-68.
137. Id. at 468.
138. Stein, supra note 135, at 1119.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1118.
141. Seidmann & Stein, supra note 135, at 467-69.
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adverse inference, the privilege allows defendants to remain silent and avoid
conviction.
With this analysis in mind, consider how rendering silence punishable
would affect both defendants and fact finders. Imagine, contrary to the cur-
rent doctrine, that the legal system imposes an extra penalty on convicted
defendants who refuse to testify. Assume also that such a penalty is manda-
tory, and that fact finders are aware of it.
The imposition of a penalty for silence has two divergent effects. First, it
may reduce defendants' incentives to remain silent. If silence is punishable,
defendants will be more likely to take the stand in order to avoid the addi-
tional sanction (the "sanction effect"). Second, it may encourage defendants
to remain silent. Since fact finders adjust the burden of proof in accord-
ance with the size of the punishment, the imposition of an extra penalty
will elevate the evidentiary threshold for conviction when defendants do
not testify.142 Because a higher burden of proof is more likely to result in
exoneration, imposing a penalty can spur defendants to remain silent (the
"evidentiary effect").
Using the above framework, one can see that the manner in which these
two competing effects play out depends on the strength of the inculpating
evidence and the size of the penalty imposed for remaining silent. When the
case against the defendants is strong, the "sanction effect" will dominate
defendants' decisions. Assuming the penalty for silence is not excessively
high, defendants in strong cases will be convicted even if the burden of
proof is shifted upward (i.e., they will be convicted despite the "evidentiary
effect"). As such, they will prefer to testify in order to avoid the penalty for
remaining silent. In contrast, when the prosecution's evidence alone is insuf-
ficient to secure a conviction (weak and intermediate cases), the
"evidentiary effect" will dominate defendants' decisions. Assuming that the
penalty for silence is not excessively low, the upward shift in the burden of
proof will allow defendants to avoid conviction even in the face of a bias
against silent defendants. These defendants will therefore remain silent.
Contrasting these results highlights the advantage of a regime that
punishes a defendant's silence. While such a regime induces defendants in
strong cases to testify, this does not adversely affect them. Given the prose-
cution's strong evidence, these defendants will be convicted whether or not
they testify. On the other hand, punishing defendants' silence will assist
defendants in weak and intermediate cases in exercising their privilege
against self-incrimination. The proposed regime thus helps the group of de-
fendants for whom the right to silence is most important (those in
intermediate cases), while not harming any other group of defendants (those
in weak and strong cases).
An illustration can demonstrate the implications of punishing silence.
For ease of exposition, imagine that fact finders adjust the burden of proof
in a linear proportion to the level of sanction. Thus, for a sanction of one-
142. See supra Part I (demonstrating the endogenous relation between the size of sanc-
tions and the standard of proof).
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year imprisonment, fact finders will convict if the probative strength of the
inculpating evidence is at least x; for two-year imprisonment, they will con-
vict if the probative strength of the inculpating evidence is at least 2x; for
three-year imprisonment, at least 3x; and so forth. Suppose that the sanction
for theft is ten years, and that three defendants (A, B, C) face charges. The
case against A is weak; the case against B is strong; the case against C is
intermediate. Specifically, assume that the probative strength of the prose-
cutor's evidence against the defendants is x, lOx, and 5x, respectively. All
three defendants do not wish to testify so as to avoid the risk of
self-incrimination. Finally, suppose that the magnitude of the fact finders'
evidentiary bias against silent defendants is 5x.
The following table summarizes the defendants' expected behavior (re-
maining silent or testifying) under two possible regimes. 43 The first regime,
consistent with the current doctrine, assumes a fixed sanction for theft (ten
years). Under the second regime, while the penalty for theft is still ten years,
an extra penalty of five years (for a total of fifteen years) is imposed on a
convicted defendant who invoked the right to silence during her trial.
TABLE I
DEFENDANTS' BEHAVIOR WITH AND WITHOUT
A PENALTY FOR SILENCE
Fixed Sanction Silence Punishable
(10 YEARS) (10 YEARS + 5 YEARS PENALTY)
Defendant A Silence Silence
(weak: lx) (no conviction) (no conviction)
Defendant B Silence/Testimony Testimony
(strong: lOx) (conviction-iC years) (conviction-lO years)
Defendant C Silence/Testimony Silence
(intermediate: 5x) (conviction--i 0 years) (no conviction)
Consider initially how punishing silence will affect Defendant A's be-
havior. Under the first regime, a fixed penalty of ten years is imposed on
convicted defendants. Because the fact finders adjust the burden of proof
linearly with the applicable sanction, Defendant A will be convicted only if
the strength of the incriminating evidence is at least l0x. Notwithstanding
fact finders' bias against silent defendants, Defendant A will remain silent.
Since the combination of fact finders' bias and the prosecution's incriminat-
ing evidence is insufficient to satisfy the burden of proof (5x + lx < l0x),
remaining silent allows Defendant A to avoid conviction. This conclusion,
however, is true also under the second regime, where an extra penalty of five
years is imposed for silence if the defendant is convicted. Once Defendant A
143. We assume that defendants can correctly assess the strength of the evidence they
face and that jurors account for all of the evidence in the case. We later consider the desira-
bility of our proposal in a less idealized system. For a further discussion of this point, see
infra notes 202-203 and accompanying text.
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chooses to remain silent and expose herself to a sanction of fifteen years, the
prosecution must present incriminating evidence with probative strength of
15x rather than lOx. This increase in the burden the proof only reinforces
Defendant A's incentive to remain silent. With this higher evidentiary
threshold, the prosecution is even further away from proving its case (5x +
lx < 15x). Thus, under both regimes, Defendant A remains silent and avoids
conviction. 144
Consider now the case of Defendant B. Under the first regime (ten-year
imprisonment), the strength of the prosecution's evidence (lOx) is sufficient
to prove guilt. Because the prosecution has no problem factually supporting
its allegations, Defendant B is indifferent as to whether to be silent or testify.
As explained earlier, either course of action will only corroborate the al-
ready convincing inculpating evidence. Taking the stand will result in self-
incrimination; remaining silent will induce fact finders, given their bias, to
grant even greater weight to the prosecution's evidence. This indifference
between silence and testifying disappears, however, once the legal system
punishes silence. Under the second regime, if Defendant B remains silent
she is subject to a sanction of fifteen, rather than ten, years. Given this high-
er sanction, fact finders will convict if the strength of the incriminating
evidence is at least 15x. In this case, the combination of fact finders' bias
and the prosecution's incriminating evidence is sufficient to satisfy this evi-
dentiary threshold (5x + lOx = 15x). Consequently, under the second
regime, Defendant B will testify in order to avoid the extra penalty. Note,
however, that the second regime does not disadvantage Defendant B. While
she chooses to testify, Defendant B is not harmed by her testimony. Under
the first regime, Defendant B is convicted and subjected to ten-year impris-
onment whether she testifies or not. Under the second regime, Defendant B
testifies and is similarly convicted and subjected to ten-year imprison-
ment.145 It is also worth emphasizing that Defendant B's testimony plays no
role in her conviction. Rather, her conviction is based on the evidence that
the prosecution has obtained through its "own independent labors." Defend-
ant B's testimony only serves to prevent the imposition of the penalty for
silence. 146
144. More generally, this analysis applies to any defendant in a case where the strength
of the incriminating evidence against her-even combined with the bias-is insufficient to
secure a conviction. In our hypothetical, "Defendant A" thus refers to any defendant who
faces inculpating evidence of a strength ranging anywhere from Ox to just below 5x.
t45. This analysis applies whenever the prosecution can secure a conviction by its own
evidence. In our hypothetical, therefore, "Defendant B" corresponds to defendants who face
inculpating evidence with strength of 1Ox or more.
146. Legal scholarship has proposed several justifications, other than the "accusatorial
system" rationale, for defendants' right to remain silent. A list of these justifications is found
in Justice Goldberg's well-known analysis in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52
(1964). According to Murphy, the right to silence serves (1) to ensure that individuals are left
alone "until good cause is shown for disturbing [them]"; (2) to reflect "our distrust of self-
deprecatory statements"; (3) to discourage "inhumane treatment and abuses" of suspects;
(4) to allow defendants to avoid the "cruel trilemma" (the choice between self-accusation,
perjury, or contempt); and (5) to protect the innocent. Id. at 55 (internal quotation marks
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Finally, consider Defendant C's case. Under the first regime, Defendant
C faces a hard choice. Taking the stand will result in self-incrimination. If
the defendant chooses to remain silent, though, the combination of the pros-
ecution's intermediate evidence (5x) and the fact finders' bias (5x) is
sufficient to satisfy the burden of proof (10x). But this problem is resolved if
an extra penalty is imposed for silence. With such an extra penalty the fact
finders ratchet up the burden of proof (to 15x), and Defendant C can remain
silent and avoid conviction. Although the fact finders will assign probative
value to her silence, the strength of the total incriminating evidence will be
below the evidentiary threshold (5x + 5x < 15x). Therefore, under the se-
cond regime, Defendant C may remain silent and avoid conviction.'47
By punishing silence at the appropriate level, the legal system can offset
any bias fact finders may have against silent defendants. As the preceding
hypothetical shows, the actual level of the penalty for remaining silent
should correspond to the size of the bias. If the bias is limited, only a small
upward adjustment in the burden of proof will be required to compensate
for it, and the imposition of a lenient penalty will be sufficient. If the bias is
more substantial, a greater adjustment is necessary, and a more severe pen-
alty will be required. Adjusting the standard of proof in direct proportion to
the size of the bias enables the legal system to calibrate the scales for deter-
mining guilt. In the above hypothetical, fact finders' bias equaled 5x. By
imposing an extra penalty of five years the legal system could adjust the
standard of proof at the same rate.
As this analysis shows, rather than undermining the right to silence, pun-
ishing silent defendants facilitates the application of the Fifth Amendment
privilege. Only defendants against whom sufficient incriminating evidence
exists (our hypothetical Defendant B) are punished. Furthermore, no defend-
ant is in fact punished for remaining silent. Defendants are either exonerated
(Defendants A and C) or convicted and punished at the lower level without
the penalty (Defendant B). Such a sanctioning regime therefore helps de-
fendants avoid self-incrimination while not harming any other defendants.
omitted). While our proposed regime induces Defendant B to testify where before she could
choose not to, it does not undermine any of the goals set forth in Murphy. As our hypothet-
ical shows, Defendant B's testimony provides the prosecution with no advantage in securing
conviction. Whether or not silence is punishable, the prosecution must collect evidence with
probative strength of at least lOx in order to establish Defendant B's guilt. As such, penaliz-
ing silence does not enable the prosecution to "disturb" individuals without sufficient
incriminating evidence. Similarly, because the prosecution's evidentiary burden remains
intact, punishing silence does not raise the likelihood that a defendant will be convicted
based on her false confession (goal 2), nor does it increase the incentives to mistreat suspects
(goal 3). In contrast, as our analysis shows, only by raising the sanction for silent defendants
can the legal system prevent unsubstantiated convictions of defendants who wish to avoid
taking the stand (goals 4 and 5).
147. This analysis applies in cases in which the strength of the prosecution's evidence
is sufficient to secure a conviction only if corroborated by the fact finders' bias. Thus, in our
hypothetical, "Defendant C' refers to defendants who face inculpating evidence of a strength
ranging from 5x to just below lOx.
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The protection of silent defendants through the imposition of punish-
ment highlights the advantage of using criminal sanctions for their probative
function. First, it allows the legal system to protect defendants precisely
when the procedural safeguards fail to provide such protection. Rendering
silence punishable counterbalances fact finders' failure to respect the rule
that they may not infer culpability from silence. Second, harnessing pun-
ishment to protect the right to remain silent does not jeopardize other goals
of punishment. While the proposed regime allows defendants to invoke the
privilege at no cost, it also enables the legal system to continue to subject
defendants who are found guilty to the sanction that it deems appropriate.
Our discussion focuses on the Fifth Amendment privilege, yet its core
insight can be extended to other procedural rights. To the extent fact finders
draw an adverse inference from the use of such rights, defendants might be
reluctant to exercise them. 48 Rendering these rights more costly, however,
can serve to resolve this problem. Given the probative function of punish-
ment, the imposition of properly designed penalties can offset any bias fact
finders may have, and can thus enhance defendants' ability to invoke their
rights.
C. Punishing Recidivists
The preceding analysis has demonstrated the advantage of using crim-
inal sanctions as a means to reduce the likelihood of unsubstantiated
convictions. In the criminal attempt context, the risk of a wrongful convic-
tion results from the combination of mitigated sanctions and an actus reus
element that is both overinclusive and underinclusive. Enhancing the pun-
ishment for the offense itself (an attempt to commit a crime) allows the legal
system to induce fact finders to convict only when the defendant's guilt is
supported by sufficient evidence. In the context of the right to silence, the
risk of wrongful conviction stems from the fact finders' bias in response to
the defendant's behavior during trial (her decision to avoid the stand). Ren-
dering this behavior punishable can neutralize the bias.
This Section presents a third context-punishment of recidivists-in
which the probative function of punishment can be harnessed to prevent
convictions based on inadmissible information. Fact finders who are aware
or suspicious of the defendant's criminal history often tend to assume her
guilt in the case even in the absence of clear evidence. As such, defendants
with prior convictions (or those who the fact finders suspect have such a
record), like silent defendants, face a risk of biased decisions. Unlike silent
defendants, however, recidivists experience a bias that is unrelated to their
conduct during trial. Rather, the bias in this context stems from the defend-
ant's conduct prior to the case at hand. As this Section shows, increasing the
punishment for the alleged offense can help protect defendants with a crim-
148. It has been suggested, for example, that fact finders may draw a negative inference
from legal representation. See State v. Roberts, 208 N.W.2d 744, 747 (Minn. 1973) (recog-
nizing that jurors may inappropriately infer guilt from defendant's request for counsel during
police interrogation, which may justify rendering such evidence inadmissible).
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inal record from unsubstantiated convictions. This insight highlights an
overlooked rationale for the widespread, yet controversial, practice of esca-
lating punishments for recidivists.
1. Criminal Record and the Risk of Wrongful Conviction
As widely acknowledged by judges, practitioners, and commentators,
fact finders tend to infer guilt from the existence of prior convictions. Exper-
iments studying mock jurors' behavior have found that the likelihood of
conviction increases significantly once information regarding the defend-
ant's prior record is made available.'49 Studies involving judges have
similarly demonstrated that even professional fact finders may fail to disre-
gard the defendant's prior convictions in determining her guilt in the case at
hand. 150
Because of the highly prejudicial nature of evidence regarding defend-
ants' criminal history, the current evidentiary and procedural rules restrict
the admissibility and use of such information in two ways. First, according
to Federal Rule of Evidence 404, prosecutors are generally prohibited from
introducing past convictions to the triers of fact. 5 ' Second, pursuant to Rule
105, in cases where fact finders become aware of prior convictions, the de-
fendant may demand that they be instructed to avoid making any inference
as to her guilt in the present case based on those convictions.152
In practice, however, neither of these rules has sufficiently protected
defendants with prior records. Notwithstanding Rule 404, there are a
number of situations in which fact finders can become aware or suspicious
of defendants' criminal histories. First, because prosecutors may use prior
convictions to impeach the credibility of defendants who testify, infor-
mation regarding defendants' criminal histories often becomes admissible.
As Rule 609(a) provides, prosecutors can introduce evidence of the de-
fendant's past conviction if her crime involved "dishonesty or false
statement" or if "the probative value of admitting the evidence outweighs
its prejudicial effect to the accused."' 53 While the provisions of Rule
609(a) are rather restrictive, commentators have shown that "[they] are
149. Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 129, at 1358-61 (reviewing the literature on the
effects of prior convictions on mock jurors' decisions).
150. Id. at 1361-63 (reviewing the literature on the effects of prior convictions on judg-
es' decisions).
151. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) ("Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible
to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.").
152. FED. R. EVID. 105 ("When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for one
purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the court,
upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury according-
ly.").
153. FED. R. EvID. 609(a).
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honored in the breach."'' 54 Impeaching evidence involving prior convictions
is thus "routinely" introduced.
55
Second, even when defendants do not testify, fact finders may become
aware of prior convictions from out-of-court sources such as newspaper
stories and television reports.5 6 As with Rule 609, courts have shown a
tendency to downplay the possible adverse impact that such information
may have on the defendant's trial.' 7 In this regard, courts examine wheth-
er such sources create a "presumption of inherent prejudice" that justifies
a change of venue, and whether the trial jurors themselves demonstrated
an "actual prejudice" that justifies their removal. 58 With respect to the
former, courts have reserved the finding of presumed prejudice to "rare
and extreme cases." 159 As for the latter, courts have emphasized that mere
knowledge of prior convictions is not sufficient to remove a juror.1 60 Rather,
a person may serve on a jury as long as he can "lay aside his impression or
opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.'
'6 1
Therefore, current doctrine has not managed to exclude such information
from jurors. 162
Finally, in cases in which the defendant does not take the stand, fact
finders may suspect that this decision is motivated by the defendant's desire
154. E.g., John H. Blume, The Dilemma of the Criminal Defendant with a Prior Rec-
ord-Lessons from the Wrongfully Convicted, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 477, 483 (2008).
155. Mirjan R. Damalka, Propensity Evidence in Continental Legal Systems, 70 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 55, 59 (1994). The high correlation between defendants' testimony and jurors'
knowledge of prior convictions is supported empirically. In Kalven and Zesiel's classic study,
when the defendant took the stand, the jury learned about her criminal history 72 percent of
the time. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HAND ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 147 (1966). More re-
cent studies, while suggesting that jurors learn of prior convictions at a lower rate, still
indicate that that rate is substantial. E.g., Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 129, at 1375 (report-
ing that 52 percent of jurors learned of the defendant's record when the defendant testified).
156. Kalven and Zesiel's study found that when defendants with a prior record chose
not to testify, jurors nevertheless learned of their criminal history 13 percent of the time.
KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 155, at 147. Similarly, in Eisenberg and Hans's study, jurors
learned of silent defendants' criminal histories nearly 9 percent of the time. Eisenberg &
Hans, supra note 129, at 1375.
157. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 581 F.3d 775, 786-89 (8th Cir. 2009) (hold-
ing that jurors' knowledge of prior convictions does not alone render them prejudiced);
United States v. Blom, 242 F.3d 799, 804-05 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding jury not prejudiced
although pretrial publicity made juror familiar with defendant's criminal history); Hale v.
Gibson, 227 F.3d 1298, 1332-33 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that a jury's exposure to a de-
fendant's prior convictions cannot alone demonstrate that the defendant was denied due
process).
158. See Blom, 242 F.3d at 803.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 804 & n.2 (discussing the use of cautionary instructions and citing
Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 585 (1994)).
161. Id. at 805 (quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961)).
162. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 114, § 23.1(a) (noting that jurors will be "unable to
exclude from their consideration facts or allegations that were reported in the news coverage
but never presented at trial").
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to hide her past offenses. Given the defendant's reluctance to expose her
criminal record, the jury could "infer that the defendant chose to stay silent
due to the pressure of prior conviction impeachment."' Thus, even when
no evidence is presented regarding the defendant's criminal history, the jury
may nonetheless suspect that the defendant has been involved in crime and
infer her guilt in the present case. 164
The high likelihood that fact finders will be aware or suspicious of de-
fendants' prior convictions is not mitigated by jury instructions. Studies
have shown that such instructions are ineffective because jurors tend to ig-
nore them. Moreover, several researchers have demonstrated that instructing
the jury regarding the probative weight of prior convictions may actually
raise the significance they assign to this evidence.165 In a study by Professor
Pickel, for example, mock jurors were exposed to testimony that alluded to
the defendant's prior conviction. 166 One group of mock jurors was told that
this information was inadmissible, and received no further instructions. 167 A
second group was told that the information was inadmissible, and also re-
ceived an explanation regarding the provisions of Rule 609.168 The results
indicated that the explanation of the rule "backfired," and the rate of partici-
pants voting in favor of a guilty verdict actually increased. While only 43
percent of the participants in the first group voted to convict the defendant,
55 percent did so in the second group. 69
In light of the weak protection that the existing rules provide defendants,
the current legal regime has been subject to ongoing criticisms. As the fol-
lowing discussion demonstrates, however, properly designed penalties may
succeed in protecting innocent defendants where procedural and evidentiary
rules fail.
163. Edward Roslak, Note, Game Over: A Proposal To Reform Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 609, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 695, 701 n.50 (2009). As experimental studies have
shown, jurors might be suspicious even in the absence of any evidence regarding the defend-
ant's past involvement in crime. See, e.g., Sally Lloyd-Bostock, The Effects on Juries of
Hearing About the Defendant's Previous Criminal Record: A Simulation Study, 2000 CRIM.
L. REV 734, 753 (finding that 65.6 percent of mock jurors in a control group-who were
given no information about the defendant's record-believed the defendant had one or more
prior convictions).
164. This final category reinforces our previous arguments regarding the need to protect
silent defendants. Defendants' refusals to testify can increase the risk of wrongful convic-
tions for two separate reasons. First, as the evidence discussed in Section III.A shows, jurors
may interpret silence as the defendant's desire to hide incriminating information regarding
the present case. Second, the jury may assume that the defendant is avoiding the stand in
order to conceal her prior record. To remove the risk of unsubstantiated conviction, therefore,
the legal system must account for each type of bias.
165. Lieberman & Arndt, supra note 118, at 689-91 (reviewing the evidence on the
"backfire" effect caused by limiting instructions).
166. Kerri L. Pickel, Inducing Jurors To Disregard Inadmissible Evidence: A Legal
Explanation Does Not Help, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 407 (1995).
167. Id. at411-12.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 414.
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2. Protecting Defendants with Prior Convictions
A defendant's criminal history is a main factor in determining the size of
her punishment. 170 All else being equal, repeat offenders are subject to
harsher penalties than criminals who committed the identical crime for the
first time. Statutory enhancements of punishment for recidivists are wide-
spread. All of the states' sentencing guidelines adjust the grading of an
offense upward in cases in which the offender has a criminal record.' 17 Fur-
thermore, several states have adopted specific statutes that provide for
mandatory enhanced penalties for habitual criminals.
172
Despite the prevalence of escalating penalties for recidivists, legal
scholarship-both deontological and consequentialist-has struggled to
provide a normative theory that justifies this practice. Retributive as well as
deterrence concerns, at least on a prima facie level, require that individuals
committing the same offense be subjected to the same level of punishment.
From the perspective of just desert, "[a] person who robs another of $20 at
gun point is no more blameworthy simply because she had five years earlier
been convicted of burglary."'173 Similarly, under deterrence theories, where
"the key factor in assessing the optimal penalty for a given offense is the
social harm that will result from the offense," punishing recidivists more
severely is unjustified since "the social harm from a given offense would
seem to have nothing to do with the offense history of the offender."' 74
Current legal theories attempting to justify the imposition of enhanced
sanctions on recidivists, both from retributive and deterrence perspectives,
have exhibited an offender-centered approach. The most prominent retrib-
utive theory offered in support of this practice is the "progressive loss of
mitigation theory."'' 75 Proposed by Professor von Hirsch, this theory as-
sumes that humans are fallible and thus may "lapse" into committing an
offense. 176 As such, the legal system should take into account the nature of
170. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF STRUCTURED SEN-
TENCING 67 (1996) ("[P]rior record, is the second major consideration in determining
guideline sentences.").
171. MICHAEL H. TONRY, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 97 (2004) (noting that all
state guideline systems account for prior record).
172. These laws are often referred to as "three-strike" laws. For a comparative descrip-
tion, see JOHN CLARK ET AL., "THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT": A REVIEW OF STATE
LEGISLATION 7, ex. 9 (1997).
173. Markus Dirk Dubber, Recidivist Statutes as Arational Punishment, 43 BUFF. L.
REV. 689, 705 (1995).
174. David A. Dana, Rethinking the Puzzle of Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offend-
ers, 110 YALE L.J. 733, 736 (2001).
175. See Andrew von Hirsch, Criminal Record Rides Again, 10 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 2, 2
(1991) [hereinafter von Hirsch, Criminal Record] (discussing the "progressive loss of mitiga-
tion" theory generally); see also Andrew von Hirsch & Martin Wasik, Section 29 Revised:
Previous Convictions in Sentencing, 1994 CRIM. L. REV. 409 (analyzing legislation in light
of the theory).
176. See von Hirsch, Criminal Record, supra note 175, at 55.
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human frailty and give first-time offenders a "second chance."'177 As an
offender continues to engage in criminal activity, however, it is no longer
likely that his behavior can be described as a lapse. 7 8 Thus, after giving an
offender an initial "discount," the legal system should progressively increase
the level of punishment.
79
The dominant deterrence rationale has been articulated by Professors
Polinsky and Rubinfeld. In an influential article, they demonstrate that the
imposition of enhanced sanctions allows for adjusting the level of punish-
ment in proportion to the propensity of individuals to commit crime. 8,
Because harsher sanctions may result in overdeterrence and increase en-
forcement costs, they should be avoided whenever possible. As Polinsky
and Rubinfeld emphasize, escalating penalties enable the legal system to
punish harshly only those criminals who have evidenced that lower sanc-
tions do not deter them. Imagine, for example, that a sanction of ten-year
imprisonment is sufficient to deter most, but not all, potential thieves. For a
small group of criminals, the benefit of stealing is particularly high, and thus
only the threat of twenty-year imprisonment will deter them. Under these
circumstances, setting the punishment for theft at ten years and
increasing it to twenty years if the defendant has a prior record allows ad-
justment of the sanction in accordance with a defendant's propensity to
engage in theft. By applying such a "price discriminating" system, harsh
(and costly) sanctions are reserved only for those offenders who have
proved to be undeterred by more lenient (and less costly) sanctions.' 8 '
The probative theory of punishment, however, suggests that this offender-
centered approach provides an incomplete account of the possible
justifications for increasing recidivists' punishments. In light of the weak
protection provided by the current evidentiary and procedural rules, enhanced
sanctions enable the legal system to reduce the risk of unsubstantiated
convictions of defendants with a prior record. Elevating the punishment for
such defendants increases the evidentiary standard for conviction. This
adjustment in the standard of proof can thus offset the fact finders' bias, and
calibrate the scale for the determination of guilt. Because higher sanctions
induce fact finders to demand evidence with greater probative weight, the
imposition of enhanced sanctions ensures that defendants with prior records
will be convicted only when sufficient evidence is presented.
Furthermore, applying escalating penalties directly addresses one of the
primary factors underlying the bias against defendants with criminal histo-
ries. Scholars analyzing fact finders' behavior have suggested that




180. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, A Model of Optimal Fines for Repeat
Offenders, 46 J. PuB. EcON. 291 (1991).
181. Id. at 292-93.
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associated with the mistake of convicting a truly innocent person."'' 12 Con-
sequently, knowledge of the defendant's prior record will often "decrease
the standard of proof or the amount of evidence required to find him or
her guilty. ' 183 This theoretical supposition has recently been confirmed by
Professors Eisenberg and Hans. Using extensive data from criminal trials,
Eisenberg and Hans explored how the introduction of criminal records
affects trial outcomes. Based on regression analysis, they concluded that
"[tihe conviction threshold appears to differ for defendants with and with-
out criminal records.... [J]urors appear willing to convict on less strong
other evidence if the defendant has a criminal past."'8 Rendering the pun-
ishment mandatory and of a sufficient size can thus counterbalance this
cognitive process, and assure that the evidentiary standard applied to de-
fendants with a prior record corresponds to the standard applied with
respect to first-time offenders.
The argument in favor of using enhanced sanctions to protect defendants
with criminal records has both practical and descriptive appeal. From a
practical perspective, such sanctions enable the legal system to respond to
the various circumstances that may trigger the bias. As noted, the current
rules that aim to protect defendants with prior convictions focus on preclud-
ing information regarding these convictions from reaching the jury or on
regulating the way in which the jurors may evaluate the information. As
such, these rules are ineffective in cases in which no reference is made to
the defendant's history but jurors are nonetheless suspicious of her prior
record. In contrast, enhanced penalties work to remove fact finders' bias
whether they are informed or merely suspicious of the defendant's criminal
history. Fact finders who suspect that the defendant has a prior record will
also expect her to be punished with an enhanced sanction. The more suspi-
cious they are, the more fact finders will expect the defendant to be subject
to an enhanced sanction, and the more they will ratchet up the evidentiary
standard. Properly designed punishments can therefore protect defendants
from unsubstantiated convictions whether jurors are certain or only suspi-
cious (at any level) of a defendant's criminal record.
From a descriptive perspective, the proposed approach may also explain
the practice of attaching a "recidivist premium" to crimes that are unrelated
to the offender's previous crimes. Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
for example, the recidivist premium is primarily determined in accordance
with the length of the defendant's prior sentences. 18 5 Whether the defend-
182. Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions:
When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence To Decide on Guilt, 9 L. & Hum. BEHAv. 37, 45
(1985).
183. Id.
184. Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 129, at 1386.
185. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4AI.l(a)-(f) (2010) (setting out the
Guidelines' general framework toward repeat offenders). The Guidelines, however, do in-
clude some provisions that account for the similarity between present and past behavior. See
id. § 4AI.3(a)(2)(C) (allowing for upward adjustment of grading because of "[pirior similar
misconduct established by a civil adjudication"); id. § 4AI.3(a)(2)(E) (allowing for upward
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ant's previous and current offenses are related is mostly insignificant. Con-
sequently, two defendants who previously shoplifted together and were
sentenced to one year imprisonment will be assessed the same premium in a
later case even if one is accused of shoplifting again, while the other is ac-
cused of causing a car accident while intoxicated.
The offender-centered theories, of both von Hirsch and Polinsky and
Rubinfeld, fail to explain this practice. As von Hirsch himself acknowledg-
es, the nature of the offender's criminal history is an important factor in
determining whether his current offense can be considered a lapse that war-
rants leniency. 86 In this respect, a distinction should be made between an
offender who commits the same offense twice and an offender who commits
two unrelated offenses. While the former offender should receive no dis-
count, the latter might be entitled (contrary to current practice) to a reduced
punishment. Specifically, the legal system should exhibit leniency when the
offender's current offense is more serious than the offense he committed in
the past. As von Hirsch explains, "[s]omeone convicted of his first serious
crime should be entitled to plead that such gravely reprehensible conduct
has been uncharacteristic of him, and hence that he deserves to have his
penalty scaled down--even when he has a record of lesser infractions." '87
Similarly, Polinsky and Rubinfeld's theory, which focuses on the pro-
pensity of individuals to commit crimes, is largely inapplicable in the
context of unrelated offenses. A defendant's previous shoplifting conviction
indicates that he was not deterred by the expected punishment. Subjecting
this defendant to a higher penalty for shoplifting is necessary to deter him
from repeating this crime. The defendant's history of shoplifting, however,
sheds no light on his propensity (or lack thereof) for binge drinking and
reckless driving. Imposing an enhanced sanction for reckless driving is jus-
tified only once the defendant's criminal record indicates that he had been
involved in previous driving or alcohol-related offenses.
Once the focus shifts to innocent defendants, however, the probative
theory provides support for the imposition of enhanced sanctions for unre-
lated offenses. Studies suggest that even when prior convictions are
unrelated to the current indictment, fact finders may infer the defendant's
guilt from her criminal history. In a study conducted by Professors Wissler
and Saks, four groups of mock jurors were given evidence regarding the
defendant's possible involvement in an auto theft. 188 Participants in the con-
trol group received no information regarding the defendant's prior
convictions. 89 In the remaining three groups, participants were informed
that the defendant had been previously convicted of one the following three
adjustment of grading because of "[pirior similar adult criminal conduct not resulting in a
criminal conviction").
186. See ANDREW VON HIRSCH & ANDREW ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING
148-49 (2005).
187. Id. at 154-55.




offenses: auto theft, murder, or perjury.190 Results showed that compared to
the control group, participants in the experimental groups were more likely
to find the defendant guilty.191 Furthermore, this increased likelihood was
observed across all the three experimental groups, highlighting how both
related and unrelated prior offenses increase the likelihood of a biased deci-
sion. Specifically, whereas only 35% of participants in the control group
were willing to convict, in both the murder and perjury conditions the con-
viction rate was increased to 70% (compared with 80% in the auto theft
group).192 These findings suggest that repeat offenders, whether accused of
committing the same crime or an unrelated crime, are exposed to the risk of
unsubstantiated convictions and should therefore be subject to an augment-
ed sanction.
While enhanced penalties enable the legal system to protect defend-
ants when fact finders have different levels of certainty (informed or
merely suspicious) regarding their prior records and for different types of
offenses (related and unrelated), this protection may come at a cost. Our
preceding analysis of criminal attempts and the right to silence has
demonstrated that the imposition of mandatory enhanced sanctions as a
means to avoid unsubstantiated convictions does not compromise the other
goals of punishment. In the context of criminal attempts, raising the sanc-
tion for incomplete offenses reduces the risk of wrongful conviction and
thus enables punishment of the guilty at an appropriate level.'93 In the con-
text of the right to silence, the imposition of an additional penalty for
avoiding the stand benefits silent defendants without adversely affecting
other defendants. 194 In the case of recidivists, however, adopting a regime of
mandatory enhanced sanctions may result in the imposition of harsh sanc-
tions even when criminal-centered or victim-centered approaches may
support a more lenient sanction. Raising the sanction for theft can help pre-
vent the conviction (due to fact finders' bias) of innocent defendants with a
prior record, accused of a theft they did not commit. However, it will also
increase the punishment for defendants with a prior conviction who indeed
engaged in theft, where sufficient evidence can be found to prove their guilt.
If the "recidivist premium" necessary to protect innocent defendants is sig-
nificant, the sanction imposed on convicted thieves with a prior record
might exceed the level justified by just-desert or efficient-deterrence princi-
ples. Thus, in designing punishments for defendants with a criminal history,
the legal system may face a tradeoff between protecting innocent defendants
and appropriately punishing guilty offenders.
To be sure, the existence of such a tradeoff and its scope depends on the
fact finders' behavior and the characteristics of both potential offenders and
190. Id.
191. Id. at41.
192. Id. at 43. But see Lloyd-Bostock, supra note 163, at 744-45 (reporting that dissim-
ilar past convictions lower the probability of convictions among mock jurors).
193. See supra Section III.A.2.
194. See supra Section III.B.2.
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defendants. If fact finders' reactions to enhanced sanctions is such that only
a small recidivist premium is sufficient in order to overcome their bias, then
the level of punishment proposed by the probative approach might not differ
much from that proposed by other theories. In addition, if the population of
guilty defendants is composed of a relatively small group of recidivists and
a large group of first-time offenders, the application of enhanced sanctions
serves to protect innocent defendants with prior records without affecting
the punishment of most guilty offenders. However, even if a small premium
is unlikely to be effective or the population of criminals is more diverse, the
case for enhanced sanctions might still be compelling for both deterrence
and retributivist approaches.
For theorists endorsing efficient deterrence, determining whether the
probative theory can justify the application of enhanced sanctions for recid-
ivists requires balancing two competing factors. On the one hand, setting a
punishment beyond the level necessary to deter potential criminals may cre-
ate overdeterrence 9.1 5 On the other hand, punishing innocent defendants
dilutes the deterrent effect of criminal sanctions and may result in under-
deterrence.1 96 If the latter factor dominates the former, deterrence-oriented
theorists will favor a legal system that imposes a recidivist premium. To this
extent, the probative theory highlights the potential to use criminal sanctions
to enhance deterrence not only by raising the costs of illicit behavior but
also by reducing the likelihood of false convictions.
For retributivists, the probative theory introduces a new consideration in
the design of criminal punishments. When evidentiary and procedural rules
cannot ensure the integrity of the fact-finding process, criminals' behavior
creates two types of detrimental results. First, criminals' engagement in il-
licit behavior inflicts harm on their victims. Second, in the case of erroneous
convictions, criminals' conduct also inflicts harm on innocent defendants.
The existence of this latter type of harm supports the imposition of penalties
like the recidivist premium. It is precisely the goal of just desert-the desire
to punish criminals according to their culpability and the harm they inflict-
that may justify the imposition of enhanced penalties. Because criminals'
behavior increases the risk of unsubstantiated convictions, offenders should
bear the costs of eliminating this risk.
The intensive debate surrounding the imposition of enhanced sanctions
for recidivists reflects the complexity of the legal questions that such a penal
regime raises. Scholars and policymakers addressing the issue have restrict-
ed their analysis to the effects of enhanced sanctions on potential and actual
offenders. The preceding discussion, however, highlights that this debate
should also explore how changes in sanction size may affect innocent defend-
ants with prior records. More generally, our analysis suggests the advantage of
mandatory punishments of sufficient size in contexts in which biases against
defendants may lead to unsubstantiated convictions. Irrespective of whether
195. SHAVELL, supra note 7, at 475-76 (analyzing the problem of discouraging desira-
ble acts with excessive sanctions).
196. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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one supports or criticizes such penalties, understanding their effect on the
risk of erroneous convictions allows both consequentialists and deontolo-
gists to appreciate the actual costs of their choice.
IV. OBJECTIONS
Thus far, our analysis has highlighted the advantages of incentivizing
fact finders through the design of criminal sanctions. We have demonstrated
that such sanctions can reduce the risk of unsubstantiated decisions, often
without jeopardizing the other goals of punishment. In this Part, we turn to
discuss possible objections regarding the legal system's ability to properly
design and apply such a penal regime.
A first objection to the theory of punishment presented in this Article is
that it might bring about an undue increase in the level of punishment. The
severity of criminal punishments in the United States has risen dramatically
over the past three decades. 197 Opponents of this trend have expressed seri-
ous concerns that these punishments are excessively harsh. 198 To the extent
that punishments are indeed already too harsh, raising them further in order
to protect defendants will exacerbate an existing problem.
Our proposal, however, does not advocate increasing the penalties im-
posed on criminals. First, properly designed sanctions can often protect
defendants from unsubstantiated convictions without raising the penalty for
convicted defendants. As demonstrated in the context of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege, when silence is punishable, defendants are either exonerated
or subject to the regular (rather than the enhanced) sanction. Second, even
when our theory affects the penalty of convicted defendants, it does not
support harsher punishments. Our analysis presents an ordinal rather than a
cardinal theory of punishment: it highlights the advantage of punishing cer-
tain behaviors more severely than others, but does not address the absolute
size of the punishment in question. 99 For example, it may well be that the
current sanctions for both complete and inchoate crimes are too high. What
we show, however, is the advantage of punishing both behaviors equally.
A second concern that might be raised relates to the availability of the
information required to determine sanctions' optimal size. To address the
197. The key figure exemplifying this trend is the incarceration rate. According to the
Bureau of Justice Statistics, the number of incarcerated inmates grew from 139 per popula-
tion of 100,000 in 1980 to 502 per 100,000 in 2009. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
KEY FACTS AT A GLANCE: INCARCERATION RATE, 1980-2009 (2009), available at http://
bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/glance/tables/incrttab.cfm (last updated Sept. 18, 2011).
198. See, e.g., Joseph E. Kennedy, The Jena Six, Mass Incarceration, and the Remorali-
zation of Civil Rights, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 477 (2009) (studying the effect of
incarceration and civil rights on racial relations); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The
Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best,
91 GEO. L.J. 949, 994-99 (2003) (presenting a utilitarian argument against extended incar-
ceration).
199. On the distinction between ordinal and cardinal theories of punishment, see An-
drew von Hirsch, Equality, "Anisonomy," and Justice: A Review of Madness and the
Criminal Law, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1093, 1095-98 (1984) (book review).
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risk of unsubstantiated decisions, fact finders should be induced to adjust
the standard of proof at the appropriate level. For instance, in the numeric
example discussing the right to silence, a five-year penalty was required to
overcome the bias against silent defendants.2°° With a penalty of a different
size, fact finders would over- or underadjust the standard in such a way that
might ultimately exacerbate the problem rather than solve it.
This concern suggests that more empirical research needs to be conducted.
The current experimental literature, while exposing the interdependence of the
severity of sanctions and evidentiary thresholds, provides only a partial ac-
count of this phenomenon. Additional studies will enable us to draw a more
complete picture of fact finders' behavior. More particularly, these studies
should attempt to shed more light on the proportion by which fact finders
adjust the standard of proof in relation to the increase in the size of the sanc-
tion. Arguably, this proportion might be affected by factors such as the type
of sanction (fines compared to incarceration), the crime involved (property
crimes compared to bodily injury crimes) and the identity of the fact finders
(judges compared to juries).
The informational hurdle, however, should not prevent policymakers
from using sanctions as means to incentivize fact finders. Legal systems
often use criminal sanctions to deter crime. Setting sanctions at the right
level from the perspective of deterrence requires information regarding
many relevant factors, such as the benefit that the perpetrator derives from
her illicit conduct, the social harm caused by the crime, and individuals'
attitude toward risk-information that is not always easy to obtain. Never-
theless, legal systems have been successful in designing criminal penalties
that properly deter crime. Absent reasons to suppose otherwise, one may
assume they will also be able to obtain the necessary information to proper-
ly incentivize fact finders.
A third concern involves the risk of error. Even if the legal system can
obtain the necessary information to properly set the size of sanctions, it
cannot entirely prevent mistaken judgments. The implication in our case is
that innocent defendants who are wrongfully convicted will be subject to
aggravated penalties. In the right to silence example, if fact finders fail to
acquit an innocent defendant who invoked the right, this defendant will be
subjected not only to the basic punishment but also to the extra penalty for
remaining silent.
This objection, however, disregards the many contexts in which the legal
system applies enhanced sanctions despite the risk of possible mistakes.
Consider, for example, the rule endorsed by many jurisdictions that increas-
es the punishment for crimes committed with a weapon.2 10 While this rule
may be consistent with the principle of just desert (bearing arms makes
200. See supra Section III.B.2.
201. See Jon S. Vernick & Lisa M. Hepburn, State and Federal Gun Laws: Trends for
1970-99, in EVALUATING GUN POLICY: EFFECTS ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE 345, 392-95 (Jens
Ludwig & Philip J. Cook eds., 2003) (reporting that between 1970 and 1996 thirty states
adopted such laws).
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crimes more morally reprehensible) or deterrence (the higher sanction dis-
courages violent crimes), it increases the costs of mistaken judgments. In a
system that applies such a rule, an innocent defendant who is convicted of
armed robbery is subject to an aggravated punishment. Nevertheless, the
benefits that such a rule provides have been regarded as sufficient to out-
weigh this concern. Similarly, to the extent that policymakers wish to
address the risk of unsubstantiated decisions, they may determine that the
advantages of using mandatory sanctions to incentivize fact finders are suf-
ficient to offset the costs that such sanctions inflict on defendants who are
wrongfully convicted.
A fourth possible objection might be doctrinal. As mentioned earlier, the
general rule is that fact finders should not be aware of the specific punish-
ment that the defendant faces. 02 If fact finders are completely ignorant of
the applicable punishment, the imposition of aggravated sanctions will not
cause them to increase the burden of proof. To induce fact finders to raise
the evidentiary threshold for conviction, they must be knowledgeable about
the mandatory nature of the sanction and its size.
This valid doctrinal point, however, does not undermine the preceding
analysis. To begin with, the point is relevant only in settings in which there
is a distinction between the body responsible for the determination of guilt
and the body charged with sentencing. Thus, in bench trials-where both of
these decisions are made by the judge-the trier of fact is fully aware of the
applicable sanction.20 1 Furthermore, our analysis does not advocate inform-
ing jurors of the specific punishment to which the defendant is exposed. To
induce jurors to properly adjust the burden of proof, knowledge about gen-
eral sentencing rules is sufficient. For example, with respect to criminal
attempts, jurors are not required to be aware of the concrete punishment at
stake. They need only be aware of the rule regarding the equal treatment of
complete and incomplete crimes.
Finally, one may argue that the high rate of plea bargains renders our
discussion incomplete. Once plea bargaining is incorporated into the analyt-
ical framework, concerns might arise regarding the use of mandatory
enhanced sanctions. The imposition of such penalties may disproportionate-
ly increase the prosecution's bargaining power and thus unfairly
disadvantage defendants. 20
4
The prosecution's bargaining power, however, depends on two factors.
First, as the level of the applicable sanction rises, prosecutors have greater
leverage over defendants. Thus, adopting enhanced mandatory sanctions
may provide persecutors more bargaining power when negotiating a plea.
202. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
203. See Adam M. Gershowitz, 12 Unnecessary Men: The Case for Eliminating Jury
Trials in Drunk Driving Cases, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 961, 984-87 (comparing jury trials to
bench trials and noting that judges have "full knowledge of the sentencing range and typical
punishments").
204. See Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CALIF.
L. REV. 1471, 1505-17 (1993) (modeling the way in which guidelines transfer power to
prosecutors).
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Second, as the likelihood of conviction falls, prosecutors have less lever-
age over defendants. Because enhanced mandatory sanctions cause fact
finders to increase the standard of proof, they also reduce the bargaining
power that prosecutors possess. Consequently, imposing the sanctions that
we recommend does not necessarily disfavor defendants who engage in
plea bargaining. More generally, this insight suggests that criticisms
leveled against the shift toward mandatory punishments in the federal sen-
tencing guidelines and against this shift's effect on defendants' bargaining
power have not offered a complete account of the potential implications of
such a regime.
205
In sum, reforming the penal system in light of the theory presented in
this Article certainly raises several concerns. These concerns, nonetheless,
do not represent an insurmountable obstacle. Cautious application of the
theory, coupled with careful examination of its effects in the real world, can
allow policymakers to harness criminal sanctions in order to decrease the
risk of unsubstantiated decisions.
CONCLUSION
This Article presents a new approach regarding the role of criminal pun-
ishment. Building on the literature documenting the connection between the
sanction severity and fact finders' willingness to convict, it shows that pun-
ishment can be structured to protect defendants from wrongful convictions.
Because higher punishments induce fact finders to ratchet up the standard of
proof, mandatory sanctions of sufficient size can lower the probability of
error in situations where evidentiary and procedural rules have proved to be
ineffective. Our analysis further demonstrates that designing criminal sanc-
tions to protect the innocent often does not require compromising the other
goals of punishment.
We illustrate the advantage of using sanctions to incentivize fact finders
in three contexts in which defendants face a particularly high risk of errone-
ous convictions: inchoate crimes, the right to silence, and evidence of
defendants' existing criminal records. Fact finders in these contexts might
rely on insufficient or inadmissible evidence. By imposing mandatory sanc-
tions of sufficient size, the legal system can induce these fact finders to
convict only when sufficient admissible evidence proves the defendant's
guilt.
The insight that fact finders apply flexible evidentiary standards has po-
tential implications beyond the criminal context. Scholars have suggested
that the evidentiary standards in civil lawsuits might be influenced by the
dollar amount at stake.2 6 The greater the amount of damages a plaintiff
205. See, e.g., id. at 1532-37 (arguing that the guidelines should be discretionary rather
than mandatory).
206. See Mark C. Dickinson, Note, Damages for Insider Trading Violations in an Im-
personal Market Context, 7 J. CoRP. L. 97, 112 (1981) ("[T]he measure of damages may
have an actual influence on the standard of proof employed by the court."); see also Richard
Craswell, Instrumental Theories of Compensation: A Survey, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1135,
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seeks to collect, the higher the evidentiary standards that fact finders will
apply.
To the extent that this interdependence exists, rules regarding compensa-
tion have greater significance than conventionally perceived. These rules not
only provide the monetary value of the litigation but may also affect its out-
come. In the tort context, for example, the observed behavior provides a
new prism through which the ramifications (and desirability) of punitive
damages can be explored. Furthermore, in contrast to criminal sanctions that
are determined by the legal system, the stakes of civil litigation can be de-
signed ex ante by the parties themselves. Parties to a contract, for example,
often predetermine the amount to be paid in case of breach.2 7 Courts have
traditionally struck down such liquidated damages provisions when the
agreed amount appears unduly skewed against the breaching party.208 This
approach, however, disregards the advantage that promisors may derive
from harsh liquidated damages provisions. High damages can protect prom-
isors who may be concerned that fact finders will be inclined to erroneously
find them liable. A high compensation amount can serve to induce fact find-
ers to increase the evidentiary standard, and thus it can reduce the risk of an
unsubstantiated decision.
The existence of flexible standards of proof may also affect the enduring
debate regarding the comparative advantages of "all-or-nothing" and "propor-
tional" liability regimes. 209 Under the former type of liability, plaintiffs receive
full compensation if they satisfy a certain legal threshold, but receive nothing
if they fail to meet this threshold. Under the latter type, no threshold is ap-
plied, and plaintiffs collect damages in proportion to the relative strength of
their claim. In the context of uncertain causation, for example, the rule that
provides for full compensation once causation is proved beyond a 50 percent
threshold of likeliness represents an "all or nothing" regime, whereas the rule
in which the amount of damages is adjusted continuously to the probability of
causation represents a "proportional" regime.
Legal scholarship has often compared all-or-nothing and proportional li-
ability regimes in terms of their ability to maximize social welfare or to
comply with corrective-justice principles2t 0 The preceding analysis, howev-
er, suggests that the choice between these regimes will also affect the
applicable evidentiary standard. Under an all-or-nothing regime, fact finders
must determine whether to award the plaintiff full compensation. In con-
trast, under a proportional regime, they may award partial compensation.
1170 (2003) (analyzing the implications of a potential connection between the size of dam-
ages and the burden of proof).
207. See U.C.C. § 2-718 (2005) (specifying the legal framework that is applied to liqui-
dated damages).
208. For a review of the case law, see Larry A. DiMatteo, A Theory of Efficient Penalty:
Eliminating the Law of Liquidated Damages, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 633, 655-75 (2001).
209. For a recent review of the literature, see Shmuel Leshem & Geoffrey Miller, All-
or-Nothing Versus Proportionate Damages, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 345, 350-51 (2009).
210. E.g., ARIEL PORAT & ALEX STEIN, LIABILITY UNDER UNCERTAINTY 42-43 (2001)
(discussing the justifications for both regimes).
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This difference suggests that courts awarding compensation under the se-
cond regime will often apply a lower standard of proof than courts
determining cases under the first regime.21 Incorporating this insight into
the existing analysis regarding all-or-nothing and proportional liability re-
gimes will provide greater understanding of their actual effects.
In conclusion, the framework put forward in this Article lays the
groundwork for a large body of future research. Further empirical studies
regarding the interdependence of evidentiary standards and the stakes of
litigation can enhance our understanding of the intricate characteristics of
fact finders' behavior. In addition, more theoretical studies can explore the
potential applications of the framework to other areas of law. Coupled to-
gether, these studies will enable legal scholarship to develop a
comprehensive account of the probative function of sanctions and remedies.
211. For example, suppose that in a negligence case the evidence shows that the proba-
bility that the defendant's behavior caused the harm (the element of causation) is 60 percent.
Under a proportional causation regime, the plaintiff may collect 60 percent of her loss,
whereas under an all-or-nothing regime she can collect the entire amount of her injury. To
win the case, the plaintiff must also prove the unreasonableness of the defendant's conduct
(the element of fault). The standard of proof that fact finders will apply in determining
whether the defendant's behavior was unreasonable, however, is likely to be different under
each regime. Given the potential interdependency between the amount of damages and the
evidentiary threshold, the evidentiary standard will be lower under the proportional regime.
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